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**Vice Foreign Minister Meets UN Disarmament
Official**

*OW0410152490 Beijing XINHUA in English
1456 GMT 4 Oct 90*

[Text] Beijing, October 4 (XINHUA)—Chinese Vice
Minister of Foreign Affairs Liu Huaqiu met here today

Jayantha Dhanapala, director of the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

They discussed the issues of international disarmament
and security.

Dhanapala and his wife arrived here Wednesday for a
goodwill visit.

NORTH KOREA

U.S. 'Must' Remove Nuclear Weapons From South

SK2709112990 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
1029 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Pyongyang, September 27 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN in a by-lined article today says that though the U.S. rulers are resorting to every conceivable talk to keep nuclear weapons in South Korea on any account, they cannot provide justification for them.

The article says:

The U.S. rulers' intention to keep their troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea is contrary to their words, as they proclaimed an end to the cold war and the advent of an era of peace.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught:

"Speaking from the point of view of a fair deal, the United States is not at all justified in having brought nuclear weapons to South Korea and made it a nuclear base in confrontation with us who possess no nuclear arms."

Our Republic does not want the existence of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, but opposes one side threatening and blackmailing the other with nuclear weapons, creating a danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and thus infringing upon peace and security in Korea, Asia and the rest of the world.

That is why our Republic put forward the proposal to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone and has made all sincere efforts for its realisation.

Under such condition, the United States has no reason to keep its nuclear weapons in South Korea.

The U.S. imperialists' nuclear policy in South Korea is quite contrary to the aim and demand of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The United States, as a signatory under legal obligations to implement the treaty, must act in compliance with the spirit and demand of the treaty and dismantle nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in South Korea to remove a nuclear threat against the DPRK.

The U.S. rulers preach that the existence of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea is "to ensure military equilibrium" and is a demand of the South Korean people. This is a nonsensical excuse which is not worth a farthing.

As for military equilibrium, the South Korean armed forces are, in fact, far superior to the North. It is an open secret that in South Korea there are about 1 million regular forces of the puppet army equipped with modern U.S.-made arms. The forces of our people's army are equal to or less than a half of them.

The U.S. Rulers are trying to continuously keep their troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea under the pretext of ensuring "military equilibrium" but it can never be justified.

Today foreign troop pullout and nuclear disarmament have become a trend worldwide. The United States is also showing signs of it in some regions. There is no ground for it to refuse the withdrawal of its troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea alone. If the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons in South Korea are aimed at other socialist countries, it must take a step to withdraw them from there now that it has signed a nuclear arms reduction treaty and is holding disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union. And it must not refuse denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula as it agreed upon establishing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

The United States must renounce its old confrontation policy of the era of the cold war on the Korean peninsula, too, and withdraw its troops and nuclear weapons out of South Korea. Whether it does that or not is a touchstone showing whether its talk about peace and nuclear disarmament is true or not.

VANUATU

Premier Calls for Nuclear-Free Pacific at UN

BK0410084390 *Melbourne Overseas Service in English*
0500 GMT 4 Oct 90

[Text] Vanuatu's prime minister, Father Walter Lini, has made a plea for a nuclear-free Pacific at the United Nations. Father Lini told the General Assembly the countries in the region are small and extremely vulnerable to external economic factors as well as sudden climatic changes.

He said the Pacific people preferred to live in peace. Yet their land, waters, and atmosphere were being used by others to test weapons of mass destruction. Father Lini said the testing of nuclear weapons continue to cause the people to fear for the future for their young and of unborn generations.

Father Lini also raised the region's concern about the planned destruction of chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll. He said the region should not become a permanent toxic disposal for the world.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Confer in New York

PM0310131190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] New York, 1 October—The foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact states have held a meeting here. There was a thorough exchange of opinions on questions of the transformation of the Warsaw Pact Organization in accordance with the new world and European realities, on the elaboration of a declaration on relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, on the talks on reducing conventional arms, and on preparations for the Paris summit meeting within the CSCE framework.

Participating were the foreign ministers of the USSR—E.A. Shevardnadze; Bulgaria—L. Gotsev; Hungary—G. Jeszenszky; Romania—A. Nastase; Poland—K. Skubiszewski; and Czechoslovakia—J. Dienstbier; and Kh. Domke [name as transliterated], state secretary of the GDR Foreign Ministry.

BULGARIA

Zhelev Offers To Dismantle SS-23 Missiles

AU2809122490 Sofia BTA in English 1040 GMT
28 Sep 90

[Excerpt] Washington, 28 September (BTA)—At his yesterday's meeting with U.S. Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleberger in Washington, Bulgaria's president, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, extended an invitation to send military specialists to Bulgaria to dismantle eight medium-range SS-23 tactical missiles supplied by the Soviet Union in 1986, the head of the Office of the President, Mr. Ivaylo Trifonov, has announced. The announcement was released by THE WASHINGTON POST. [passage omitted]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Latest Data Concerning Soviet Troop Withdrawal

AU2909162390 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY
in Czech 19 Sep 90 p 1

["(fr)"]-signed report: "Not a Single Rocket Any Longer?"]

[Text] Yesterday we succeeded in securing from the Federal Ministry of Defense the latest data regarding the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from our territory—this question was unsuccessfully asked by many journalists from prominent Western papers at a news conference not so long ago. We can do a service to them: As of 0600 yesterday, 39,596 Soviet soldiers, representing 53.8 percent of their total number "temporarily" deployed in our

country, left Czechoslovakia. A total of 765 tanks are on their home territory (that is, 62.7 percent), 1244 combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers (48 percent), 234 anti-aircraft defense systems and 62 aircraft of all types. To this we can add 92 helicopters and 30 rocket-launching devices—they are gone altogether.

Anti-CW Defense Unit To Go to Saudi Arabia

Trained for Use in Gulf

AU2609164490 Prague CTK in English 1832 GMT
24 Sep 90

[Text] Prague, September 24 (CTK)—An anti-chemical defense unit comprising 170 men is currently being trained in Czechoslovakia in order to be ready for deployment in Saudi Arabia if the president and the government of Czechoslovakia decide so, the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry said today.

The training of the unit follows a statement by President Havel during his current visit to Italy that Czechoslovakia could possibly participate in an international military action against Iraq. The ministry said the unit, capable of providing first aid in an attack involving the use of chemical weapons, consists of Czechoslovak Army volunteers and the deployment of civilians is being considered. The unit will be equipped with 48 automobiles, 10 trailers, and 200 tonnes of material.

Unit Organizer Interviewed

LD2609220890 Prague Television Service in Czech
2022 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Interview with Colonel Jan (Valo), organizer of the Czechoslovak Army volunteer unit to be sent to the Gulf region, by unidentified announcer in the Prague television studio on 26 September—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] I now welcome in the studio Colonel Jan (Valo), organizer of the Czechoslovak unit which is to be sent to the Persian Gulf in the next few days. Good evening to you. I would like to ask the colonel: Had the Army not found out about this unit from the president's pronouncement in Italy?

[(Valo)] This is not at all the case, because otherwise we would not be in the stage of training volunteers, in which we now find ourselves. I would say rather that the Army informed the president about the training of the volunteers, about the present situation and about the state of training of this unit.

[Announcer] Under discussion is a unit comprising 200 or 170 men. In which stage are the preparations—how many of them got registered?

[(Valo)] More than 200 got registered. They are exclusively volunteers. However, after health checks and prescribed psychological tests were carried out, several of them dropped out. Other specialists got themselves registered,

and more men were added to the unit, so that approximately up to 200 men are being trained at the present time.

[Announcer] Colonel, Czechoslovakia will send mainly chemical troops. Do you have an idea of chemical weapons in Iraq's possession? Are they not just by chance our own weapons?

[(Valo)] The chemical specialists who are in this unit have of course a good knowledge of chemical weapons, which could be used—and in no case can these be our chemical weapons. Naturally, one cannot expect or rule out a surprise. But they have been trained and they are specialists in the right area.

[Announcer] Colonel, are these people strictly and exclusively volunteers?

[(Valo)] They are strictly volunteers. This principle was very strictly observed. I personally spoke to the majority of these people, I explained the conditions to them and asked them once again in front of the whole collective in which we were. Because at present they have been split according to their specializations on whether they agreed with their deployment in the Persian Gulf area.

[Announcer] Can you tell us the approximate ratio between the enlisted men and officers?

[(Valo)] It is approximately 50-50.

[Announcer] When do you expect the unit to depart?

[(Valo)] The date of deployment cannot be precisely determined at present, because it is still dependant on the whole number of, I would say, administrative matters—or perhaps agreements on questions of transport, on resolving the questions of transportation, and so on. However, as far as the Czechoslovak Army is concerned, we are already prepared now.

[Announcer] Does the unit already have a commander?

[(Valo)] The commander will be selected from the volunteers according to the principles that he should be the most experienced person, who would correspond to the criteria placed on the commander in this area.

[Announcer] And here is a question which is related to this. To whom will this Czechoslovak unit be subordinated?

[Unidentified correspondent] And in this connection I would like to ask whether this does not contradict our Constitution.

[(Valo)] Its subordination has so far not been determined, because it will depend on an appropriate bilateral agreement. No decision has so far been made as to whether this will be a joint command or whether it will be a part of the civilian defense of a state, which could ask for this protection.

[Announcer] And here is my last question: How long should this unit remain there?

[(Valo)] The unit should remain there a month as a minimum, if it is deployed, depending on the situation. However, its maximum stay should be 10 months. In the case that the unit is required to stay longer, it would be replaced.

[Announcer] Colonel, I thank you for your information and for your visit.

[(Valo)] Thank you.

Dubrovsky Remarks on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD2509220390 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1630 GMT 25 Sep 90*

[Excerpts] Today at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague journalists met Deputy Minister Lubos Dobrovsky, employees of the ministry, and other guests. Editor Vladimir Vjercak reports:

[Vjercak] [passage omitted] Interesting data about the progress of Soviet troop withdrawal were provided by Major General Nadovic: On 24 September 40,400 soldiers were withdrawn, i.e. 55 percent; 880 tanks, i.e. 72 percent; almost all the air defense equipment; and 57,882 tonnes of ammunition, i.e., more than half the quantity stored on our territory.

According to Gen. Nadovic, the withdrawal is carried out quicker than planned and before the end of 1990 not even one combat division or regiment of helicopters will be in Czechoslovakia.

Regarding our military presence in Saudi Arabia, Lubos Dobrovsky said that so far we had not been officially asked for it. There are also legislative and diplomatic obstacles. Nevertheless, a small unit of experts in antichemical warfare is being prepared.

Regarding some prospects of our foreign policy, the deputy minister said it concentrated, for instance, on the non-European Mediterranean countries, with the intention to support the spreading of the ideas of the Helsinki process.

Soviet Troop Presence in Nove Zamky Ends

*LD2509153190 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak
1000 GMT 25 Sep 90*

[Summary] The stationing of Soviet troops in Nove Zamky is ending today with the handing over of the Chapayev barracks to the municipal authorities. The remaining Soviet troops will stay in the Juraj Dozsa barracks for another two weeks. Such is the rapid course of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, which were deployed in the West Slovak region within the framework of the Irkutsk-Pinsk division. They will not be replaced by Czechoslovak Army units and it is therefore the town's intention to reconstruct the military buildings speedily for civilian purposes. Town authorities have, however, a big worry with taking over apartments vacated by Soviet troops. Out of 92 apartment units vacated, the majority have been damaged and moreover some of them have been looted by local people.

BRAZIL

President Collor on Tlatelolco Treaty

PY2509140090 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo
Television in Portuguese 1413 GMT 24 Sep 90

[Speech by President Fernando Collor de Mello at the 45th United Nations General Assembly in New York on 24 September—live; broadcast in progress]

[Excerpts] ... Mr. President and delegates. My compliments on your election. Your talent guarantees that our activities will be conducted with efficiency and fairness. I also want to thank your distinguished predecessor for the important task he carried out.

UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, I assure you that Brazil follows and supports the diplomatic action you have taken in the exercise of your responsibilities. We recognize your dynamic, dedicated effort for the great objectives of the United Nations. A few days ago Liechtenstein was admitted as a new member. In the name of Brazil, I wish to welcome it and wish it success in our organization.

Mr. President, this is the first time I have addressed the UN General Assembly. I am moved by the fact that this year I am inaugurating a general debate at a time when numerous and deep transformations in Brazil and throughout the world are changing concepts and preconceptions that strangled the international community for years. I have come to convey the thoughts of the Brazilian people and government on global expectations for peace, freedom, and progress, and on the role the United Nations will play in the next few years. [passage omitted]

The Brazilian Government is prepared to discuss guidelines for a new international structure capable of ensuring peace and promoting cooperation. Preservation of the current political and economic arrangement in the world does not seem to be sufficient, less so, a reenactment of the recent or remote past. The outmoded concept of power, the very old concept of power as the capability to destroy and as the manifestation of economic hegemony should be definitively abandoned. The practical instruments for the exercise of this concept of power must be taken apart.

Consequently, first the military alliances must be transformed in depth so that they can reflect the convergence and interdependence of the times we have just begun to live. Second, the partial process of disarmament must be expanded, assuming a general and total scope, especially in the area of nuclear and chemical weapons, thus honoring the international community's aspirations. Finally, situations of regional tension must be submitted to rigorous diplomatic and political treatment that will eradicate them as focuses of global instability.

Above all, it is absolutely necessary to articulate a modern concept of world power consisting of a revolutionary capacity for inventing, producing, and building for the benefit of all nations and all peoples. [passage omitted]

The South Atlantic peace and cooperation zone, which was created in a UN General Assembly resolution, is becoming more and more important. Now that international tension is decreasing, this zone has been bringing out new interests for the community, such as defense and preservation of the marine environment. In this field, our peace and cooperation zone can play a pioneer role at the international level if it is granted more decided financial and technological cooperation.

Messrs. UN chairman and delegates, Brazil has ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty and at international forums, has reasserted its respect for this treaty and other similar international agreements. Recently, Brazil and Argentina publicly announced that implementation of the Tlatelolco Treaty is being intensively discussed by the interested parties. This treaty, which is a pioneer Latin American initiative in the field of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, has preceded any other regional or international effort in this regard.

I believe, Messrs. chairman and delegates, that it is time to seek more ambitious goals. The Brazil of today rules out the idea of conducting any tests that may involve nuclear explosions, even for peaceful means, and Brazil expects other countries to consider following this example.

Mr. Chairman, Brazil is interested in all changes aimed at consolidating freedom and democracy, strengthening true peace and international security, putting an end to old myths, and reconciling effectiveness with justice. Not all that has happened in the international scenario looks toward the future. The power structures, for example, have not been affected at their core. We can even fear increased international economic and political stratification due to discrimination in allowing access to scientific and technological knowledge.

Disarmament efforts are still in an embryonic stage, and their diplomatic handling has never been so detached from multilateral forums. Military episodes in various parts of the world also show that many regional security problems have yet to be solved. Unfortunately, xenophobic and racist outbreaks are recurrently happening in some areas. By no means, however, do we give up our optimism, Messrs. chairman and delegates. As we well know, history will not be rewritten. We believe that in the face of the overall challenges of modern life, humanity will advance toward peaceful and productive ways of coexisting despite the difficulties and hardships that may arise in its path. The new international structure must be a real advance toward the pursuit of human happiness. We are not doomed to further political confrontation and violence. A promising agenda is being announced. Not only is the reactivation of economic development and international cooperation included in this agenda, but it also contemplates absolute guarantees for all human rights—be they political, economic, or social. It calls for coordinated preservation of the environment worldwide, and for an antinarcotics trafficking fight. [passage omitted]

General Views Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Test Plans

90SV0077A Leningrad *LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 8 Aug 90 p 3

[Article by Mikhail Chernyshov, APN science columnist:
"Test Range on Novaya Zemlya"]

[Text] While the politicians are trying to come to an agreement on a numerical reduction in nuclear weapons stockpiles, the process of their qualitative improvement is moving along in its own way. Nuclear charges continue to burst in deep shafts and cleverly arranged tunnels, marking that technical progress that mankind should have gotten rid of a long time ago. Until recently, two test ranges were the leaders in numbers of tests: one in Nevada (United States) and one in the area of Semipalatinsk (USSR).

"With respect to the Semipalatinsk test range," says Lieutenant General Sergey Zelentsov, deputy chief of one of the main directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense, "it cannot be ruled out that by 1993 nuclear tests will come to a complete stop on the range, and that another nuclear test range on Novaya Zemlya will take upon itself the entire future program of nuclear weapons development..."

Plans for shifting the center of gravity of tests to Novaya Zemlya did not come about by themselves. The establishment of a test range in the area of Semipalatinsk was started at the end of the 1940's at the initiative of Academician I. Kurchatov, the manager of atomic operations in the USSR. At that time, these areas were remote and sparsely populated places. But time passed, they were made more habitable, and now these are far from sparsely populated territories. Of course, everything is done during tests to eliminate the spread of radioactivity beyond the bounds of those immediate zones where explosions are conducted. The test method is such that a charge, when it explodes, apparently tightly seals itself in the ground. But one can also understand the psychology of those who live on territories adjacent to the test range.

Explosions shook the ground from month to month. Incidentally, the force of man-made earthquakes in Semipalatinsk, which was situated quite far from the test range, sometimes reached a three-four magnitude of seismic intensity. During explosions, columns of dust rise above mountains. And you must query: Is this ordinary dust or radioactive dust? In short, the public movement for the cessation of tests on the Semipalatinsk test range recently has become so powerful that the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a decree requiring the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Nuclear Power Industry to examine the question of stopping tests on the Semipalatinsk test range and to submit a recommendation to the USSR Council of Ministers.

"It must be said," Zelentsov continued his narrative, "that the test range on Novaya Zemlya was by no means opened just yesterday. It has been in operation since 1954. More than a hundred tests have been conducted there already, but preference was given to Semipalatinsk for the simple reason that transport and other expenditures on explosions in Kazakhstan, of course, are lower in comparison with costs for similar work on Novaya Zemlya. While on the average 15 explosions were conducted annually on the Semipalatinsk test range, on Novaya Zemlya, also because of unfavorable climatic conditions, the work was limited to one-two, or a maximum of three tests a year..."

From the beginning of the 1940's to the middle of the 1980's, more than 1,500 nuclear explosions were conducted in the world by five states that possessed nuclear weapons: the United States, USSR, France, Great Britain, and China. The highest number of explosions belongs to the United States. The ratio "in favor of the United States" continues to this day.

The nuclear powers have long since recognized the danger of an uncontrolled arms race, and they adopted a number of agreements on test limits. Since 1963, nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water have been banned. In the future, the USSR and the United States have agreed to limit the upper threshold of yield of charges undergoing testing to 150 kilotons. However, the idea of a complete and general ban on nuclear weapons tests cannot make headway as a number of states, especially India, Argentina, Pakistan, Brazil, Israel, and the Republic of South Africa remain outside the agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. All of this indicates that the last nuclear explosion on the planet very likely will not be heard very soon.

Novaya Zemlya is a group of islands that stretches in a longitudinal direction for approximately a thousand kilometers, and their overall area is more than 80,000 square kilometers. Approximately one-fourth is mountains covered with ice, and the remaining territory is hilly arctic tundra. It is 200-300 kilometers to the nearest population centers on the continental part of the USSR. The archipelago itself has a settlement of testers, and military subunits are deployed there. Several powerful air and above-water explosions at altitudes of three to 10 kilometers and also nuclear weapons underwater tests were conducted on Novaya Zemlya before the treaty of 1963. Naturally, this led to a worsening of the radiation situation on the archipelago, but in the past 30 years, as numerous tests have indicated, even with continuing underground testing the level of background radiation has fallen to the value of the natural background of the planet, and in a radiation sense it can be considered ecologically safe. Verification of the radiation situation is conducted not only by services of the USSR Ministry of Defense, but also by specialists of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control, USSR Ministry of Health, and the USSR Academy of Sciences.

"The problem of increasing the intensity of tests on the Novaya Zemlya test range, with a reduction on the Semipalatinsk test range," emphasizes Zelentsov, "is very complicated for us. A place cannot be found on the planet now where a nuclear explosion, even with all precautionary measures, would not affect someone's interests. There are enough unpopulated areas on USSR territory, but they are not all suitable for setting up a new test range. For example, if there are significant deposits of minerals, then sooner or later such areas will start to become inhabited. Careful geologic explorations were conducted on Novaya Zemlya, and they showed that there are virtually no major deposits here. There is also no indigenous population on the archipelago. And, finally, if a test range is to be established absolutely in a new place, then this will require enormous expenditures, but Novaya Zemlya already has a base, and it has the necessary structures, although, I repeat, the transfer of all tests to the archipelago will be associated with significant organizational complexities and, in any case, it will require an increase in expenditures. But I would also like to note that all discussions on the transfer of tests are still of a preliminary nature. It is necessary that these plans be approved by the appropriate levels, including the USSR Supreme Soviet..."

The position of military specialists who support the operational readiness of nuclear weapons, and of the nuclear physicists who are engaged in basic research, is clear: They have to do their work. But, you see, today's far north is also no longer an icy wasteland. Settlements are scattered along the continental coast, teams of geologists and oil industry workers are working there, and ship convoys are plying the Northern Sea route. And, indeed, our northern neighbors—the Finns, Swedes, and Danes are not indifferent to the state of affairs on a Soviet nuclear test range. How does one deal with this?

"Our country," says Zelentsov, "cannot unilaterally stop all tests, and we also cannot do without an agreement, first and foremost with the United States, to reduce the yields of test charges, for this is fraught with a breach of parity. The main obstacle to the achievement of an agreement on reducing the number of tests, and also the yield of test charges, and this is achievable in principle, is the aim of the United States to conduct nuclear explosions within the framework of the SDI program. Behind all of this is the hope of creating principally new types of weapons—superpowerful, with instantaneous fast action; we are talking, in particular, about lasers with nuclear excitation and other such systems. However, while an agreement on a complete test ban is not achievable at present, it could have been possible to come to an agreement on the reduction of charge yields to 30 and further even to 20 kilotons, and to limit the number of tests, let us say, to 10 and even fewer per year. Measures for verifying adherence to such agreements can be considered adequately developed at the present time. [no ending quotation marks as published]

Everything that has been said, incidentally, also does not contradict the idea of a nuclear-free zone in northern

Europe, which the Soviet Union proposed at one time. The implementation of this idea depends not only on the USSR and the Scandinavian countries. It is understandable that it must be examined together with all of the other aspects of the problem of nuclear disarmament and a general ban on nuclear weapons tests. The attainment of such aims is possible in the event that all states renounce nuclear tests. However, understanding the concern of the population of both our northern territories and the Scandinavian countries, we intend henceforth to conduct underground tests with guarantees for their total safety and, in addition, in a situation of maximum glasnost; that is, to invite to tests not only verification service departments that are independent of a vested interest, but also representatives of the public, including the press.

Deputy Defends Semipalatinsk Nuclear Testing

90SV0074A Moscow NEDELIA in Russian
27 Aug 90 p 4

[Report on interview with Colonel Nikolay Petrushenko, USSR People's Deputy, by Aleksandr Annin, NEDELIA correspondent; place and date not given: "The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range: To Be or Not to Be? Thousands of People Await a Competent Answer to This Question"]

[Text] At the end of May this year, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] parliament decided to close the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range. However, it is apparent that it is not possible to resolve all ecological and social problems associated with Soviet nuclear weapons tests at one stroke. The republic deputies there and then found a lot of powerful opponents—both among the leadership of the country and among the higher military ranks. The test range has been "silent" for almost a year. Nonetheless, will explosions be continued or..? Whatever happens, no one is indifferent to this question. It was this that Olzhas Suleymenov, leader of the social antinuclear movement "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" and a USSR people's deputy, talked about in NEDELIA (No 23, 1990). We will recall that in response to the question of correspondents: Who is persistently against a complete ban on nuclear tests?—O. Suleymenov answered firmly: the military. Today, we give readers the opportunity to learn the view of opponents to the closing of the Semipalatinsk test range. Our correspondent's interlocutor is USSR People's Deputy Colonel Nikolay Petrushenko.

[Annin] Nikolay Semenovich, you, perhaps, are one of the most well-known Army deputies of the Union parliament. You are a member of the deputy group "Soyuz," which is against the self-determination of the republics. You talked in February in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about the lawfulness of the pitiful, well-known actions of our troops in Baku. Finally, you have been giving voice recently "to the defense" of the Semipalatinsk test range...

[Petrushenko] Many people number me among the ultrarightists. Not long ago a unique "diagram" for a Union parliament was published in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. There my name is among the extreme conservatives, and, for some reason, right alongside in the diagram is not only Ligachev, but also Gorbachev. However, I, like Gorbachev, am a realist.

[Annin] You consider the conduct of nuclear tests near Semipalatinsk to be an inescapable reality?

[Petrushenko] We will begin with the fact that radiation, as such, has become a reality of our life. I can assure you, only less than one-half percent of the average level of radioactive background in the USSR is caused by military nuclear tests. Responsibility for the remainder lies with industry, medicine, the agricultural industry, geology, and, finally, with the Ministry of Atomic Power. This is data of the scientific committee for the study of the actions of radiation established under the United Nations Organization.

[Annin] Let us assume that the one-half percent about which you are talking is a correct figure. But, you see, it is in relation to the average quantity of Union radioactive background. Would it not be proper to assume that in the area of the Semipalatinsk test range the situation, to put it mildly, is somewhat different?

[Petrushenko] There, where the atom is in the hands of qualified specialists, there is virtually no danger of radioactive contamination of the environment. Especially since enormous sums are expended at test ranges like Semipalatinsk to assure the complete safety of the population. Well, judge for yourself: A test range almost analogous to ours is located in the state of Nevada not far from the popular Las Vegas gambling business center. This says something...

[Annin] But this is in the United States. As for the Semipalatinsk test range, it was not so long ago that we all heard the statements of deputies and important scientists who spoke frankly about the danger of tests near Semipalatinsk to the health of local residents.

[Petrushenko] I know what you have in mind. I remember the chilling television appearance of Professor Aleksey Yablokov, a USSR people's deputy, who stated that after a regular underground nuclear test, a thousand children in the surrounding area had nosebleeds. I am not referring to those people who take such reports on faith. And I have been working for several consecutive months on the study of problems associated with the test range. I familiarized myself with a mass of documents, and I walked all over the test range in every direction. I descended into a tunnel where an explosion was conducted.

The dome-shaped tunnels are 650 meters deep. After an explosion, their granite walls are transformed into "glass" that is a meter thick. Even the slightest leak of radiation to the surface and into ground water is impossible. In the tunnels the level of radiation for several

months after the explosion is such that you could open up an underground restaurant.

[Annin] Activists of the antinuclear movement "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" have declared publicly more than once that knowingly faulty instruments are used to measure the level of radiation in the test range area...

[Petrushenko] Olzhas Suleymenov accused me and some other deputies of this. He said that the "rightist" deputy group "Soyuz" went to the Semipalatinsk area with instruments that "lie."

In the first place, however, we invited all deputies to go on the trip who wanted to. And we conducted special tests using our own dosimeters. At first, in the Kremlin, where the level of radiation, you will agree, is continuously checked with maximum accuracy. Official readings and ours coincided. Afterwards, we tested the instruments at Domodedovo Airport. We compared our data with those obtained by the airport service. And that is what we did for the duration of the whole trip. Here are the figures: In Moscow, we established a radiation level on the average of thirteen microroentgens per hour; in an aircraft at an altitude of 10,000 kilometers—on the order of 260 microroentgens; in the city of Kurchatov, which is not far from the test range—11 microroentgens.

And in that place where in 1953 an overhead explosion of a hydrogen device was conducted, there is high radiation to this day—about 1,000 microroentgens per hour. At that time, in 1953, really more dangerous tests were conducted.

[Annin] In your opinion, it turns out that residents of eastern Kazakhstan are absolutely unjustifiably raising an alarm?

[Petrushenko] The mass of people, in my opinion, are being led astray. Now, in a period of general politicization, many political apologists quickly realized: Arousing passions regarding the test range, and the demand to close it (supposedly for the benefit of the people), is a powerful lever for a personal political takeoff.

[Annin] Is this not an old method, Nikolay Stepanovich, to accuse an enemy of self-interest?

[Petrushenko] But why spread fear among the inhabitants of several oblasts? In Semipalatinsk Oblast recently, specialists spent several hundred thousand rubles searching for increased radiation. They did not find it.

An interbranch commission that had 200 scientists did not succeed in doing this, and, in addition, more than two-thirds of the staff of the commission were specialists from Kazakhstan. Tests were made simultaneously over a wide territory, so to say, in "three copies." One each by the military, the interdepartmental commission, and by activists of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement. This was several months ago, but the results of the investigation were not published in the local press, which the "antinuclearists" insisted on at one time.

The fact is that the results of the tests were "politically disadvantageous" for them. But passions are continuing to heat up. The chief of the test range has been called a military criminal, although, if you look at it sensibly, he is only following an order and the will of the government.

Recently, crowds of people blocked the Kurchatov-Semipalatinsk road.

[Annin] As far as I know, the public is also dissatisfied that the test range territory is not used for pastures.

[Petrushenko] This is the situation. The test range occupies an area the size of approximately 18,000 square kilometers. The collective and state farms lay in more than a quarter million tons of hay annually. And hundreds of tons of fish are caught in a nearby lake. Continuous careful checks indicate that all of this product is clear of radiation. And the fish are generally wonderful, because there are no chemical enterprises alongside the lake.

[Annin] In short, you persistently defend the right to exist for the Semipalatinsk test range. How does this fit in with the instructions of your constituents, for you are a USSR People's Deputy from eastern Kazakh Oblast?

[Petrushenko] Of course, the voters in their instructions demand that I try to get the test range closed. But, it will be recalled that the USSR Constitution states that a people's deputy is guided by national interests and by taking into account the interests of the voters. The wording, in my opinion, is caustic. And I, of course, will fight for a halt to nuclear tests, but not in the way that this is done by the optimists in the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement.

[Annin] In what way?

[Petrushenko] Perhaps my point of view is not fashionable, but I am for a ban on such tests by all nuclear powers, but not just by us in a unilateral manner. Carefully organized international verification is necessary for this. It does not exist yet. Meanwhile, the leaders of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement could be the ones to arrange such verification in contact with scientists of the city of Kurchatov.

Suleymenov and his companions are trying for a unilateral reduction in explosions at a time when newer weapons are being developed in the West. Our scientists do not lag behind Western scientists in the field of theory, but, in contrast to the United States (if we close the test range), we will not be able to verify ideas experimentally.

[Annin] You believe that the Western countries, and in particular the United States, continue to be our probable military enemy?

[Petrushenko] Times, of course, change, but the danger of the outbreak of a world war remains, especially on the part of such countries as Iran, Iraq...

And then the scientists of the city of Kurchatov are not only engaged in military developments. The institute has proved to be the only establishment capable of conducting research work on a program to eliminate the after effects of the Chernobyl accident. This is only one example of the "peaceful" activity of the test range. Nevertheless, the "antinuclearists" demand its complete shutdown, and this means the institute also. Nuclear physics is beginning to be persecuted just as genetics was in its time. I doubt that this occurs from ignorance.

There is one "little" nuance about which not everybody knows: If the test range is closed, and with it the state Scientific Research Institute in the city of Kurchatov, then a lot of housing will be freed. It appears that the leaders of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement want to solve the local housing problem at the expense of national science and thereby raise their own prestige in the eyes of the people.

I agree that many in Semipalatinsk Oblast live in crowded conditions, but why then be hypocritical and try to prove that it is dangerous to live in Kurchatov?

[Annin] Apparently, the problems of the Semipalatinsk test range are tied in with other difficulties of the region—social, economic...

[Petrushenko] However, today's activity of the activists of the local antinuclear movement can only exacerbate these problems. One of the program aims of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" society is to ban the burial of nuclear wastes on Kazakh SSR territory. Excuse me, but where should they be taken to? Other republics will hardly be pleased with such a "gift."

It is another matter that nuclear wastes have to be reliably concealed. But what do we have in fact? According to plans of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, the republic will have to build six nuclear sarcophagi. Five to six million rubles of capital investment will have to be allocated for the construction of each one, plus a million rubles each for their maintenance. The establishment of the entire infrastructure of "sarcophagi" has been entrusted to the Ministry... of housing and communal administration of the republic. Rudely speaking, to people armed with a broom and a shovel.

[Annin] Is it not simpler and more reliable "to conceal" the radioactive wastes in the abandoned tunnels of the Semipalatinsk test range?

[Petrushenko] Exactly.

But this is impeded by public opinion that has been formed about the test range: We already have radioactive contamination, they say, and now they also want to toss us nuclear waste. So, what appears to be a noble campaign can turn into enormous, unnecessary expenditures. This means a further lowering in the people's standard of living.

The interview with Nikolay Petrushenko is only a continuation of a larger discussion about the fate of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range. Everyone has a right to his own point of view, and in this case we learned the position of a person who is directly involved in the resolution of this question.

One may not agree with Nikolay Petrushenko about a lot of things and argue.

Therefore, the editorial office is ready to continue the discussion, opening its pages to his opponents also; to those who, nonetheless, are convinced of the need for a speedy closing of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range.

Problems Associated With CFE Talks Assessed

PM2509110590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by S. Rogov, doctor of historical sciences: "No Change on the Western Front?"]

[Text] Information about the progress of the talks on cuts in conventional armed forces and arms in Europe [CFE] has been somewhat forgotten against the backdrop of the alarming reports from the Persian Gulf region.

Press silence on the Vienna talks is not, unfortunately, a case of "no news is good news." The Vienna talks, along with the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on strategic offensive arms cuts, are of key significance in the creation of a new international security system.

The process of moving on from a bipolar to a multipolar structure of international relations is under way in the world today. A difficult task is emerging here: How are we to preserve and strengthen military stability amid the radical political and economic changes?

The problem is complicated by the fact that the previous mechanisms for ensuring security have proved to be of little use in the new situation. After all, such alliances as NATO and the Warsaw Pact constituted a militarized form of ideological confrontation. They were destined to wage and not to overcome the "cold war."

With the end of the ideological "crusades," now that the tasks of building a common European home have come to the fore, an extrabloc security structure is needed for all its "inhabitants." Neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact are suitable for this task. The new European security system must be based on principles of interdependence and pluralism among all its participants.

However, the negotiating process has well and truly lagged behind the political changes of the last few months. The point is that there was no question of an end to bloc confrontation six months ago when the concept for the Vienna talks was being elaborated. It was thought then that the most that could be achieved was to regulate and stabilize NATO and Warsaw Pact confrontation by securing virtually mirrorlike equality for their armed forces in Europe. Hence the accord secured by the

sides at the talks on parity in tanks, armored combat vehicles, guns, combat aircraft, and helicopters.

Innumerable details had to be coordinated to elaborate accords of this kind. But the political situation in Europe changed drastically while the diplomats were conducting the difficult talks. It is only from the force of inertia that one can now talk about the military structure of the Warsaw Pact. One of its members—the GDR—for all intents and purposes no longer exists; Hungary is openly raising the question of the possibility of joining NATO; and several other East European states are thinking about leaving the Warsaw Pact. The withdrawal from the East European states of almost 600,000 Soviet servicemen has begun. Some republics in the Soviet Union itself are declaring "permanent neutrality."

For that reason something that seemed a great achievement a year ago seems obsolete in many respects under the new conditions. There has been a change of era but the delegations in Vienna are still arguing about how to ensure parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the planned cuts only reduce but do not eliminate the arms stockpiles. Suffice it to say that there will still be 40,000 tanks in Europe—ten times more than Hitler had 22 June 1941.

However the main question today of ensuring European security—the prevention of a military threat from a united Germany—which provides a source of concern not just for us, is not even on the agenda at the talks. A new forum has been quickly set up outside the Vienna framework to solve the problem of Germany's military-political integration into Europe. The "two-plus-four" talks between the victorious powers and the Germans have enabled a compromise to be reached—the limitation of the numerical strength of Germany's armed forces to 370,000 men—although this accord still has to be linked to the future Vienna agreements.

The "historic" treaty on cuts in conventional armed forces and arms will most probably only prove to be an intermediate stage in the creation of an all-European security structure. "Vienna-1" should be followed as quickly as possible by "Vienna-2" which will probably be founded on quite different principles—not on parity between opposing blocs but on rejection of the policy of amassing excessive levels of arms, the reduction of "ceilings" for arms and armed forces to an agreed level of defensive sufficiency for each state, and also on the creation of joint security structures on the European continent.

In order to move toward this goal, we must rapidly complete the current talks that will lay the foundation for subsequent steps. Unfortunately, no substantial progress has been recorded in Vienna of late. The specter of deadlock has actually appeared. Serious misgivings are emerging regarding the signing of a treaty this year and regarding the holding of the November summit involving the states participating in the Helsinki process.

This loss of pace is fraught with unpredictable consequences. After all, the lack of any all-European agreement recording the commitment of all the continent's states to reducing military tension will add to the uncertainty and lack of confidence, which may adversely affect the formation of new mechanisms for cooperation and trust on our continent. If progress is not consolidated, the very existence of the new system of security in Europe may be called in question.

What is hampering progress at the Vienna talks? There are a considerable number of both objective and subjective reasons.

On the one hand, the range of participants in the talks is extremely broad. Acute disagreements often arise not only between members of opposing blocs but also between members of the same alliance. On the other hand, the negotiators are having to accomplish a great deal of work and monitor a vast number of highly diverse technical and geopolitical parameters governing the balance of military forces. For instance, the objective study and comprehensive, broad discussion of technical and organizational questions of verification and the elimination and storage of arms are not yet over.

The talks are frequently held up by attempts to seek one-sided advantages. A particularly dogged battle was mounted over the conceptual definition of what is a "tank," an "aircraft," and so on. The point is that weapons systems vary considerably in different countries and arguments as to what to include and not include in a particular category of arms subject to cuts are by no means theoretical. Too much time has been wasted on discussing these problems.

However, a compromise has still not been reached on a number of highly important questions. For instance, NATO is refusing to count carrier-launched naval aviation but is demanding that surface-launched naval aviation be included in the "ceilings" on combat aircraft. This kind of "arithmetic" is, of course, designed to put the Soviet Union in a disadvantageous position.

There are problems on which our position also appears contentious. The key one being the maximum level of arms for a single country. At first we proposed a "ceiling" of 35-40 percent—while NATO members suggested 30 percent—of the total quantity of arms in Europe. But the Soviet delegation has toughened its positions of late and is stubbornly pressing for a level of "sufficiency" of 40 percent for the USSR.

This approach on our side is obviously based on a desire to create a kind of safety margin under conditions where the preservation of the Warsaw Pact seems extremely dubious. But will this prudence not be detrimental to our long-term national security interests?

First, by placing the Soviet Union in a special position in comparison with other European countries, our position at the European talks signifies, whether we like it or not, the continuation of confrontation with the West. Our country

seems to associate military danger with the threat of a fresh invasion from Europe, as was frequently the case in the past. But is it not clear that the invasion scenario is the least likely threat against a "nuclear superpower," as we will obviously still be in the foreseeable future. If you consider the fact that Germany's military potential, under the treaty signed in Moscow, will be drastically restricted, this aim seems quite unfeasible.

As indicated by public statements from some of our military, we have nevertheless continued and are continuing, through the force of inertia, to stick to our customary idea of the means of guaranteeing our security in Europe that contradict our own idea of creating a common European home. In other words, are we aiming for purely military and not political means of ensuring the country's security?

Second, the 40-percent quota of arms demanded by our Vienna delegation may revive the specter of the "Soviet threat to Europe."

One must acknowledge frankly that this threat did indeed exist, although we are not the only ones to blame for this. In one of his articles Marshal S.F. Akhromyev described how the USSR reacted to the U.S. threat to Soviet territory at the height of the "cold war": "The Soviet Union also began to take military steps in response to U.S. actions (and sometimes first). It did not have a chance to create a military threat to the United States similar to that which they posed to the USSR... The USSR and its allies took a different path. They developed a mighty grouping of ground—mainly tank—forces on their European territory and created (in response to the U.S. threat) a military threat to U.S. allies in Western Europe."

But since then we have for a long time now been presenting an answering threat to U.S. territory and ensured strategic parity. The treaty on strategic offensive arms cuts under preparation at the Geneva talks in parallel with the Vienna talks ensures the preservation of the Soviet-U.S. balance and mutual nuclear deterrence. Why should we endeavor to once again create the semblance of a military threat to European states?

It is easy to imagine Europe's response to a power that will be almost equal in arms to virtually all the other European countries together. As a result the NATO military organization will obviously become stronger once again instead of NATO's being politically transformed and the military aspects of its activity slackening off. One cannot preclude the fact that the economic and political consolidation of Western Europe will be supplemented by its military integration at a time when we may find ourselves without any allies at all. Will our neighbors want to admit an over-armed inhabitant into the common European home?

Third, our negotiating position effectively requires the disproportionate disarmament of the East European countries. According to official Warsaw Pact figures,

they account today for roughly 20 percent of the arms in Europe. If our demand were accepted, our current allies' quota would be halved.

Having begun to withdraw our troops, we are today abandoning the idea of "forward-based defense" for the USSR in Central Europe. But this will not entail a loss of strategic depth for the defense of our state if NATO keeps its present borders and the East European states are indeed independent, prosperous, and strong enough not to become a "corridor" for adventurers. It is a

well-known fact that weak states seek strong patrons. Will we not be pushing them under NATO's wing?

Fourth, the demand for "sufficiency" at the level of 40 percent of all the arms in Europe will mean—as the table below shows—that the USSR alone may still have on its European territory up to 16,000 tanks, roughly 15,000-16,000 artillery systems, more than 22,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles [IFV], and roughly 5,000 aircraft. What is more, considerable forces untouched by the Vienna agreements will be kept on our Asian territory.

Correlation of Warsaw Pact and NATO Forces in Europe (figures in thousands of units)

	Tanks		Armored Combat Vehicles		Artillery		Helicopters		Aircraft	
	NATO data	Warsaw Pact data	NATO data	Warsaw Pact data	NATO data	Warsaw Pact data	NATO data	Warsaw Pact data	NATO data	Warsaw Pact data
Warsaw Pact	51.5	59.47	93.4	70.33	43.4	71.56	3.7	2.785	8.25	7.876
of which USSR	37	41.58	64.00	45	33	50.275	2.85	2.2	6.05	5.955
NATO	22.224	30.69	47.064	46.90	17.326	57.06	2.599	5.27	4.507	7.13
"Vienna" ceilings on alliance	20		28		16.5-20		1.9		5.2-6.2	
30-percent ceilings per country	12		18.8		9.9-12		1.14		3.12-3.72	
40-percent ceilings per country	16		22.4		13.2-16		1.52		4.1-4.9	

So does this mean once again "the Red Army rules from the British seas to the taiga," once again "guns not butter," and... farewell to the hope of our country's escaping from the vicious circle in which we found ourselves as a result of the gamble on confrontation with all the world around us?

Here is another aspect of no small importance of the problems that our diplomats are encountering in Vienna. Our position once again seems to have found itself hostage, to put it mildly, to inadequate initial information which overstated NATO forces and understated Warsaw Pact forces. Our Defense Ministry's assurances of "approximate equality" in Europe do not seem to match the facts. Establishing truly equal levels for NATO and the Warsaw Pact will result in us and our allies cutting by almost three times our number of tanks and artillery and the number of IFV and armored personnel carriers by a factor of 2.5 at a time when the Western cuts for these types of arms will be considerably smaller since the NATO countries barely make the agreed "ceilings." In other words, we have, so to speak, overreached ourselves with our hypersecrecy.

The incomprehensible diligence with which we endeavored to include not only ground forces but also aviation in the agenda of the talks, citing Western superiority in this type of arms, is also surprising. Everything indicates that after having literally thrust this issue on NATO we will still be forced to eliminate considerably more aircraft than our Western partners. We will have to pay a considerable price for our ill-considered positions.

Nevertheless the numbers game seems to be continuing. According to Western sources there is another problem with tanks. The point is that, as the Defense Ministry recently stated, we have already reduced the number of our tanks in Europe by 15,800. The fact that several thousand tanks have "disappeared" from the zone of the cuts may result in a loss of the capital of trust which we have acquired in Europe with such difficulty. If these arms were urgently moved beyond the Urals, as NATO members are claiming, this would also undermine trust in our initiatives on the Asian continent.

The old saw says: A miser pays double. We are paying two-fold and three-fold for our meanness with glasnost in the defense sphere. Of course, it is up to the negotiators to uphold their state's positions at the forum in Vienna. But departmental methods of elaborating this position in strict secrecy—whereby not only the public and specialists, but also the Supreme Soviet, are deprived of full information—do not seem to facilitate an optimum assessment of the parameters for reasonable sufficiency in the defense sphere.

However, there is no time to be lost. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait has demonstrated most graphically the need for the most speedy creation of new mechanisms for ensuring international security both at global and regional levels. The summit meeting in Helsinki showed that the requisite preconditions are ripe for this. But it will only be possible to move on to the practical building of this system when crucial steps have been taken to dismantle the confrontational instruments inherited

from the "cold war" and used to ensure security, such as Warsaw Pact-NATO confrontation in Europe.

Commentary Assesses Pact Disarmament Meeting

*LD2409165790 Moscow World Service in English
1410 GMT 24 Sep 90*

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] A session of the special commission of the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of disarmament was held in Prague on 22 and 23 September. The countries' deputy foreign ministers and chiefs of staff took part in it.

The main question discussed was what must be the permissible level of the various types of weapons and technology the armies of the Warsaw Treaty are to be equipped with. Judging by reports, solving this problem is not that easy. This was recognized after the statement of Czechoslovakia's foreign minister, Mr. Robert Harencar [title as heard]. He noted that the Warsaw Treaty Organization had undergone changes in recent times and now the countries act in accordance with their sovereignty. According to the Czechoslovak press agency they succeeded in getting close to the same position on the number of planes and helicopters which must remain in the seven member countries of the Warsaw Treaty after the signing of the Vienna agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

However, at this meeting and the one held two weeks ago in Bratislava they were not able to reach agreement on the number of tanks, armored troop carriers, and artillery guns. The Soviet Union is insisting on retaining 40 percent of the tanks and artillery. Other Warsaw Treaty countries feel there should not be more than 25 percent of each type of weapon. So far, there is no unanimity on the question about the principle of sufficient forces and arms. The latest session of the Warsaw Treaty organization shows differences remain and these cannot but have an adverse effect on the Vienna talks between the NATO Warsaw Treaty countries on conventional arms in Europe, the more so since the time and place of the meeting has been set: 19 November in Paris. As the head of the U.S. delegation at these talks, Mr. James Woolsey, noted, the meeting may not take place.

Concern is being expressed in the Soviet Union over the absence of progress being made on the question of conventional forces. The Soviet parliamentary newspaper, IZVESTIYA, for example, feels that, judging by some of the speeches of a few of the Soviet military personnel, they are aiming at a purely military means of ensuring security and not by political means. Is this not in contradiction of our idea about a common European home?

Shevardnadze Attends UN Session, Meets Baker

Addresses General Assembly

*LD2509190690 Moscow TASS in English 1808 GMT
25 Sep 90*

[Excerpts] United Nations, September 25 (TASS)—Follows the full text of the speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the 45th U.N. General Assembly session on September 25.

Mr. President,
Distinguished delegates,
Ladies and gentlemen.

From the vantage point of this forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly one might look back in amazement at how strikingly different is the terrain we have covered in just one year from the familiar landscape of the preceding four decades.

Politically, this was not just a calendar year but a light year in the history of the world.

The cold war, with its accompanying stress, psychoses and anticipation of disaster, is no longer a part of our life. Gone is the strain of daily confrontation, propaganda bickering and reciprocal threats. [passage omitted]

Almost unnoticed, the military alliances have lost their enemies. They are beginning to build their relations on a new basis, moving away from confrontation which is being eroded by disarmament, lower defence spending, more wide-ranging confidence-building measures and the emergence of collective and cooperative security structures. [passage omitted]

Among the issues assuming a critical importance for the future of mankind are the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and missile technologies and, more generally, and disproportionate growth of the military sector in some economies and societies.

Even in the past the doctrines of the "balance of terror" and "nuclear deterrence" were questionable means of maintaining peace and security. In the new conditions they simply become irrelevant.

We need to define the criteria of defense sufficiency. The Iraqi aggression would seem to make it difficult even to discuss this. After all, what can be sufficient in the face of the irrational? On the other hand, the aggression has once again underscored the validity of the argument that no nation should have the exclusive prerogative or absolute freedom to determine its own level of armament. Any other approach would result in an unbridled arms race and all-out militarisation. We must look toward different principles, toward an accommodation of reciprocal concerns and a balance of armaments at the lowest possible levels.

We in the Soviet Union have the unfortunate experience of building up a redundant defense capability. This was due more to an erroneous assessment of the situation

and a desire to protect the country against any eventuality than at any evil intent or aggressiveness. At the time, we and our adversaries took an overly "arithmetical" approach to military parity. Of course, parity is needed for global stability, but it should not go beyond the limits of reasonable defense sufficiency.

We have drawn and continue to draw appropriate conclusions for ourselves. It is now common knowledge that militarisation is wasteful for any country and can be ruinous when taken to extremes.

In the longer term, the world community will need to monitor the military power of states, arms supplies and transfers of military technology. Such an approach will be in everyone's interests and will strengthen stability and trust. Otherwise, we will continue to be confronted with armed conflicts and attempts to intimidate and blackmail. Above all it will be necessary to keep a close watch on those countries that make determined efforts to build up the offensive capabilities of their armed forces. Moreover, to have them explain why this is being done.

Of course, the United Nations itself will have to play the primary role in this. But the organisation will need effective support from regional security structures which are already becoming a reality in Europe and which we hope will emerge in Asia and the Pacific, in the Middle East, in Central America and elsewhere in the world.

We might consider the idea of introducing on a global and regional level the international registration of certain types of armaments that are produced or acquired. There is a need for transparency in this area.

We need to agree on principles governing the sale and supply of arms. Such attempts were made in the past, but unfortunately they were not carried through.

In our view, we must urgently request the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to address this issue and submit recommendations to the next session of the General Assembly.

Two years ago the Soviet delegation raised the issue of reactivating the work of the Security Council's Military Staff Committee. Recent developments have convinced us of the need to return to the original idea conceived by the founders of this organisation and of its charter.

We know why the Military Staff Committee has never become a functioning body. During the cold war the committee could not and did not have a role to play. Now, however, we see that without substantive recommendations from this body the Security Council is unable to carry out its functions under the charter.

The architects of our organisation proceeded from the harsh realities of the Second World War and were right in assuming that for the organisation to be effective in keeping peace and preventing war, it must have the means to enforce its decisions and, if necessary, to suppress aggression, and have mechanism for preparing and coordinating such actions.

The Soviet delegation believes that the Security Council must take the necessary organisational steps to be able to act in strict conformity with the provisions of the charter.

It should begin by initiating steps to reactivate the work of the Military Staff Committee and study the practical aspects of assigning national military contingents to serve under the authority of the council.

The Soviet Union is prepared to conclude an appropriate agreement with the Security Council. We are sure that the other permanent members of the council and states that might be approached by it will do the same.

If the Military Staff Committee worked properly, if appropriate agreements had been concluded between the council and its permanent members, and if other organisational aspects of countering threats to peace had been worked out, there would be no need now for individual states to act unilaterally. After all, however justified they might be, such actions provoke a mixed response, create problems for those same states and may not be acceptable to all.

By contrast, there is no reason to object to steps taken by legitimate international "law-enforcement bodies"—the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee.

We should not underestimate even the psychological effect of the Security Council acquiring structures and forces to counter aggression.

I would like to emphasise that the use of force is only possible as a last resort. We must rely on non-military, political means and pursue our objectives in a peaceful manner. Today more than ever before it is these methods that are becoming effective.

The latest crisis has dramatically illustrated the importance of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

To be frank, the situation is beginning to cause alarm. Let us face it: Cracks have appeared in the nuclear non-proliferation regime; IAEA is having difficulty expanding the zone of application of its safeguards. It is time to trigger off the emergency systems in order to save the situation. As a matter of utmost urgency, nuclear tests must be stopped. If testing is stopped, we have a chance to survive; otherwise the world will perish. We need to tell people about it frankly, without taking refuge in all sorts of specious arguments. Should we perhaps invite the parliaments of all countries to express their attitude to nuclear explosions?

What else has to happen to set in motion the elimination of chemical weapons? The Soviet Union and the United States are setting an example by doing so on a bilateral basis. But what about the others? It is really odd that while there is no person, no politician who would publicly call for retaining toxic agents things are at a standstill.

Should we perhaps ask for a roll-call vote right in this room to see who votes against? If everyone is in favour, let us just work out a binding schedule for completing work on the convention and set a timeframe for the destruction of chemical weapons. Similar problems, mostly concerning verification, arise with regard to biological weapons.

Swift action is needed on all these issues, yet the debate at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament proceeds in a quiet and leisurely manner. Should this be tolerated? Even as dangerous developments are gaining critical momentum in the world, the negotiations continue at a pace that was set at the time of the cold war.

I think negotiators at the Palais des Nations in Geneva should pull up the blinds. Let them see what is going on outside and let people know that what those disarmament pundits are reflecting upon.

I don't want to offend anyone. I know that eminent people work there. But what is to be done? The time has come to cry out.

I cannot fail to mention yet another aspect of security.

The world community should also consider the possibility of various "unconventional situations" arising from the mass taking of hostages and cases of blackmail involving particularly dangerous and destructive weapons.

These problems will have to be addressed at two levels—technical and legal. We could start out by setting up a group of experts for contingency planning under the Security Council. [passage omitted]

We are well aware that a healthy environment requires considerable investment both on the national and global levels. As we see it, the way to go is to reduce military expenditures and to promote conversion in the defense production sector. There is no alternative. The figures are well known. 800 billion dollars must be spent before the end of this century to avert environmental degradation. That sum is almost equal to what the world spends on the military each year. [passage omitted]

Discusses START, CFE With Baker

*LD0310165990 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT
3 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Kochetkov, Yevgeniy Menkes, and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] United Nations, October 3 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker began another working meeting in New York today. It is taking place at the Soviet permanent mission at the United Nations.

At the end of the previous meeting, Shevardnadze and Baker told journalists that it was quite possible that they would find solutions to problems concerning cuts of

conventional arms in Europe and several issues related to the conclusion of a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

The possibility that the two men will sign a joint Soviet-U.S. statement on the responsibility for peace and security in the changing world has not been ruled out.

Expresses Satisfaction

*LD0410091790 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0240 GMT 4 Oct 90*

[Text] [No dateline as received] Our meeting today with the U.S. secretary of state was very intense and at the same time productive, Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, has stated. The Soviet and U.S. ministers answered journalists' questions immediately after the end of their third working meeting during these days. It lasted six and one-half hours.

I am very satisfied with the results of the work which has been done, pointed out Eduard Shevardnadze. The main problem which was examined this time was the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. I should like to stress that here we managed to achieve mutual understanding on all questions discussed. The minister pointed out that both sides should, naturally, discuss the adopted decisions with their allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

As Eduard Shevardnadze said, agreement was also reached at the meeting on all questions connected with the problem of the air force, except one—the question on helicopters was left unresolved. However, according to the minister, this is not the most complicated problem, and in order to find solutions it was passed on to the specialists.

During the meeting some aspects of reduction in strategic offensive weapons were seriously examined, the minister pointed out further. Of course, not all questions were examined, but serious progress was achieved here. In connection with this, he stated, there might be one more meeting with the U.S. secretary of state in New York which will enable us to prepare the ground for completion of the talks on concluding the strategic offensive weapons treaty this year.

The Soviet minister drew journalists' attention to the very important, according to him, joint Soviet-U.S. declaration 'Responsibility for Peace and Security in the Changing World,' which was adopted at this meeting. Both sides' support for UN activities was expressed in it.

For his part J. Baker, U.S. secretary of state, answering journalists' questions, expressed complete agreement with the view of E.A. Shevardnadze and his assessment of the talks that took place. Overall, J. Baker stressed, the decisions that have been reached enable one to hope that the all-European summit meeting in Paris will be prepared and will take place at the scheduled time.

Ministers Address Newsmen*LD0310173690 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1631 GMT 3 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Kochetkov, Yevgeniy Menkes, and Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] United Nations, 3 October (TASS)—Another working meeting between USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker began at the USSR's permanent mission to the United Nations in New York today. This is already the third meeting between the ministers in the last 10 days. Before it started, Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker answered journalists' questions.

Replying to a question about the purpose of the departure for Iraq of the Soviet delegation led by Yevgeniy Primakov, Eduard Shevardnadze said that there are approximately 5,000 Soviet citizens in Iraq now. The aim of the trip by Primakov, who is a member of the Presidential Council, is to organize normal conditions for the evacuation of Soviet people from Iraq.

He drew attention to the speech by U.S. President George Bush to the 45th UN General Assembly session, in which, the minister said, "the correct points of emphasis were set out" with regard to resolving the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

The Soviet minister went on to point out that the main issue which will be examined today is a discussion of unresolved problems before the all-European summit meeting in Paris. Much has already been done, but some matters remain, and they have to be resolved. Eduard Shevardnadze also noted that the sides "are working" on the problem of an Afghan settlement.

For his part, Secretary of State James Baker said that since approximately six weeks remain until the Paris meeting, attention will naturally be concentrated on the range of issues connected with preparations for it. As for the Afghan problem, "progress is being noted" here, Baker said.

Talks End*LD0410093990 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 0500 GMT 4 Oct 90*

[Text] In New York the meeting of Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, with James Baker, U.S. secretary of state, has ended. This is the third meeting that the ministers have had in the last 10 days.

It is reported that the main problem examined was the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe. The ministers also adopted a joint Soviet-American statement on responsibility for peace and security in a changing world. Expressed in it is the support of both sides for the activities of the United Nations. Commenting on the document adopted, Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze stressed that the joint

Soviet-American statement in support of the United Nations is indicative of the new approach that the countries are adhering to with regard to the role and significance of the United Nations and other international organizations and of the formation of a post-confrontational world order that is coming into being.

Answering a journalist's question on the purpose for which a Soviet delegation headed by Yevgeniy Primakov has departed for Iraq, the Soviet minister said that at the present time there are approximately 5,000 Soviet citizens in Iraq. The aim of Primakov's trip is to arrange normal conditions for the evacuation of Soviet citizens from Iraq, he stated.

TASS Assesses Obstacles at Vienna Arms Talks*LD2509200890 Moscow TASS in English 1938 GMT
25 Sep 90*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, September 25 (TASS)—Chief U.S. negotiator at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, James Woolsey, speaking about the state of affairs at the talks, was pessimistic about the possibility of completing the formulation of the first agreement by November 19, 1990, that is by the beginning of the Paris CSCE summit, where the document is planned to be signed.

Meanwhile, a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry, speaking at a briefing, expressed hope that the Vienna agreement will be finished on schedule and will objectively reflect the military and political situation in Europe.

What is it that hampers the negotiations? Agreement has not yet been reached on such questions as the reduction of shore-based naval aviation, arms control, distribution of armaments among the 16 NATO member-countries and the seven Warsaw Treaty member-countries. There is another important problem: The West believes that not a single country participating in the agreement should possess more than 30 per cent of the armaments of the entire alliance, while the Soviet Union believes that the limit should be set at 40 per cent.

Without doubt, the situation necessitates the speeding up of work at negotiations. The time has come when each participant in the forum should seriously analyse its stand and decide if the solution of some disputed questions could be put off until the next stage of the talks. For instance, the Western side should consider if the problem of reducing ship-based naval aviation would be more expedient to decide at the next stage, combined with reduction of carrier-borne aviation.

Perhaps, the problem of the division of armaments among member states in the alliances following arms reduction should not be treated in the first agreement. This problem could better be resolved within their

military-political alliances in the process of arms reduction. The situation in East European countries is extremely dynamic and has not yet stabilized everywhere.

And, finally, the question of a 30 or 40 per cent limit to arms in one country should be considered by the West on the basis of political realism, taking into consideration the changes taking place in the armed forces of the East European countries.

Western representatives must surely be aware of the amounts of armed forces and armaments reductions unilaterally made by these countries. It might happen that if the 30 per cent limit is set in the armaments of a separate country, the Warsaw Treaty organisation will be unable to muster the total arms quotas assigned for it, since the Soviet Union has so far been bearing the main burden for ensuring the alliance's defences.

One would like to hope that the forthcoming meetings of foreign ministers of NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries in New York will find solutions to problems that still hamper the successful conclusion of the negotiations in Vienna.

Military Analyst Urges Comprehensive Test Ban

*LD2609182590 Moscow TASS in English 1751 GMT
26 Sep 90*

[By TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, September 26 (TASS)—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, addressing the 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly, drew the world body's attention to a disquieting situation: the spread of weapons of mass destruction around the world.

"The situation is beginning to cause alarm. Let us face it: Cracks have appeared in the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the International Atomic Energy Agency is having difficulty expanding the zone of application of its safeguards," he emphasised.

Really, about 40 states, including a rather large number of the so-called near-nuclear ones, are still outside the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Without signing the treaty, they reserve the possibility on one fine day to declare themselves "nuclear." Representatives of these and many other countries describe the treaty as illogical and hypocritical and dub it as a conspiracy of "the haves against the have-nots."

Apparently, it must be admitted, there is a certain fraction of the truth in such reproaches. The existence of nuclear weapons prevents the democratization of international relations because in these conditions the states obviously divide into "privileged" and "non-privileged" ones.

Perfectly clear is, however, something else: It is hardly advisable to seek to remove the existing discriminatory

differences through the spread of nuclear weapons. This would only increase the danger to everyone. Genuine security and democratization in the world as a whole would be promoted only by complete elimination of the nuclear potentials of all states.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban would become an important step towards such elimination. This is why Shevardnadze stated from the U.N. rostrum: "As a matter of utmost urgency, nuclear tests must be stopped. If testing is stopped, we have a chance to survive. Otherwise the world will perish."

It can be added that without the termination of nuclear detonations the very destiny of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, an extension of which will be considered in 1995, remains unclear.

In view of the urgency of a solution to the nuclear test ban problem, the Soviet Union suggested that U.N. member nations think about holding a world wide parliamentary referendum on the issue.

Moscow and Washington made an important step of late, working out and signing protocols on limiting nuclear tests. This opened up an opportunity for the ratification of the 1974 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Tests and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. The U.S. Senate has just ratified these documents. The USSR Supreme Soviet will undoubtedly do that soon.

But what next? To begin with, the discussion of this problem should be intensified at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear explosions should be continued.

At the very outset of the talks, the Soviet Union and the United States are known to have agreed that, following the ratification of the "threshold" treaties, the sides should move on to coordinating further intermediate limitations on nuclear tests—in yield and annual amounts—on the way to the ultimate goal of complete termination of nuclear tests as part of an effective process of nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union is ready for intensive negotiations. But is the United States prepared for them? There is no clarity about that. However, the recently adopted decision of the U.S. House of Representatives, to the effect that the United States should inform the Soviet Union of its intention to immediately resume bilateral talks that would quickly lead to the elaboration of a treaty on a full verifiable ban on nuclear tests, can be regarded as a reassuring sign.

However, there has been no positive reaction on the part of the U.S. Administration either to the Soviet Union's calls or to the U.S. lawmakers' decision.

TASS Reports on U.S. Troop Cuts in Europe*LD2609221190 Moscow TASS in English 2027 GMT
26 Sep 90*

[By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin]

[Text] Washington, September 26 (TASS)—U.S. troops in Europe will be reduced by 40,000 in the 1991 fiscal year (which begins in the United States on October 1, 1990 and will continue until September 31, 1991), U.S. Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney announced here today.

The measure is taken after consultations with NATO allies and in anticipation that a CFE agreement will be completed and signed by the end of this year, the Defence Secretary's statement emphasises.

"We have to begin the drawdown now to respond in an orderly way to changing security requirements and declining defence budgets," Cheney said.

It is planned to withdraw from Europe an aggregate of 10,000 Airforce and 30,000 U.S. Army personnel. As is seen from the Pentagon's statement, although part of the personnel will begin to withdraw from bases on October 1, this year, the curtailment of the activity of units subject to cutbacks will begin only on January 1, 1991.

The Pentagon explains this by considerations of purely technical nature, the need for a balanced "de-activation" of units and by the fact a withdrawal of military units usually takes from three to four months.

Position at Vienna CFE Negotiations Criticized*PM0110103990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4*

["Political Observer's Opinion" by Stanislav Kon-drashov: "Difficult Parting With Tanks at the Vienna Talks Involving 23 Countries"]

[Text] Vienna-Moscow—How many tanks do we, the Soviet Union, need in Europe? Two in five? Or one in three? Some citizen will give it up as a hopeless cause, saying irritably: Leave it, I am fed up with tanks. And yet, for some general, the whole world revolves around the difference between these two ratios.

Nevertheless, one-third represents the lion's share, with the remaining two-thirds being divided between the other 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact states. Even NATO members agree to the Soviet one-third. But people in our country want at least two-fifths. There are also arguments over armored fighting vehicles, artillery systems, combat aircraft, and helicopters. The scene of the dispute is Vienna's Hofburg Palace at the talks between 23 states on conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. I have just returned from there with mixed impressions, which I am in a hurry to share with the reader.

At a time when Soviet people are becoming brutalized because of shortages of just about everything, people in lovely Vienna are trying to solve the problem arising from our specific surpluses—our surpluses of arms. The shortages in the stores and surpluses caused by over-militarization are two sides of the same coin that was developed over a long period by irresponsible leaders and a submissive people. But even now that the people have begun to speak out, there is a reluctance to part with the arms surpluses, while our parliament has still not learned to tackle this question.

According to the Defense Ministry position, which was confirmed by the top leadership in a directive to the Soviet delegation in Vienna, the Soviet Union demands at least 40 percent in each category of arms. That is, if each of the two military alliances has 20,000 tanks left after the cuts, the Soviet Union wants 16,000, whereas, suppose, the second country in Europe in terms of tank power—a united Germany—is to receive four times fewer tanks. Each of the alliances will have 30,000 armored fighting vehicles, and we are reserving the right to 24,000, whereas Germany again gets approximately 3,000.

The language of the Vienna talks describes these quotas as being at the level of sufficiency. The reader was able to study the details and philosophy of this problem in a recent article by Doctor of Historical Sciences S. Rogov (IZVESTIYA, No. 265). I would like to single out what things that are clearer in Vienna than in Moscow. Our stance on the level of sufficiency cannot be defended with conviction. It has provoked a very negative reaction from all delegations without exception, both NATO and Warsaw Pact. In making this demand Moscow has found itself totally isolated at the talks, which are generally characterized by a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding. It will not be possible to make all the others change their minds. That is the impression that you get from conversations with Soviet delegation head Ambassador O.A. Grinevskiy and with the heads of a number of Western and East European delegations. How can we cleave to a position which we know will be impossible to retain? And is it worth persisting?

The question is becoming urgent and it is being written into the international diplomatic schedule for this fall. It was supposed that the treaty on conventional arms cuts in Europe would be signed in November at the meeting in Paris of the top leaders of the 35 states involved in the all-European process. There is only just enough time. According to the senior U.S. representative at the talks, if eight or 10 questions remain unresolved by early-October, the chances of being in time for Paris are "very poor"—after all, even the technical side of things takes at least a month, apart from anything else, the roughly 400 pages of the text of the treaty itself and its addenda have to be set out in legal language and then translated into six languages. Thus, the obstacles have to be removed over the next few days when Shevardnadze and Baker meet together in New York and then among the foreign ministers of the Paris meeting's member states.

The importance of Paris is obvious. The cornerstone of the new all-European security structure, which has been built with consideration for German unification, the radical changes in Eastern Europe, and the profound transformation of the two military blocs, will be laid there. Is Paris going to occur at the scheduled time, 19-21 November, or not? The U.S. position is categorical: President Bush will not come to Paris if there is no conventional arms treaty.

The political stakes are high and must be given priority over narrow military stakes. But domestic circumstances influence foreign policy decisions. Gorbachev is obviously caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. On the one hand, pressure from the military leadership, whose support is vitally important for him in the current extremely critical situation. The generals want fewer cuts since the Warsaw Pact has virtually collapsed and our own border will soon be the front line of defense. That is why our required quota has risen from the previous 35-40 percent to the current minimum of 40 percent. The inertia of the former strategy is not being overcome immediately and does not synchronize with the giddy speed of the changes. Remnants of the parity thinking which ruined the country and, in a broad context, weakened its security, are still with us.

On the other hand, political arguments are more important than purely military arguments. The logic of the new thinking on this question too dictates that we seek accord with our former NATO adversaries, who have become our partners, and with our former East European allies, with whom we must now establish relations on new foundations. When both sides dispute the Soviet stance, you have to heed their arguments.

Here is one of the arguments put forward during FRG delegation head R. Hoffmann's conversation with me: We cannot publicly defend a treaty that leaves the Soviet Union with such huge stocks of arms. Some 33-35 percent is still an acceptable level, and Genscher recently confirmed this in a letter to Shevardnadze. But 40 percent is unacceptable. This difference is the "only dark patch in the bright picture of our relations." Here is one of the arguments put forward by British delegation head Paul Lever: Why do you need so many tanks and armored fighting vehicles in Europe if you can move some of your surpluses beyond the Urals, out of the treaty's zone of operation?

By the way, this transfer is already under way at full tilt, and by no means everyone in the West is closing their eyes to it, the Americans are beginning to protest. One of the Soviet delegation's military experts pointed out that the Defense Ministry is taking some of the divisions being withdrawn from Eastern Europe "over the Urals in transit as far as the Far East." Some of our best hardware is being hurriedly transferred there from Europe in exchange for obsolete equipment. I was shown a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA commentary in Vienna about the new tank reserve bases which sometimes look like half-kilometer lines of combat vehicles abandoned in an

empty field without guards. This further illustrates the problem of tank surpluses. After all, if we did not move tanks beyond the Urals, even with a quota of 16,000 tanks, we would have to destroy 25,000 tanks—that is more than the NATO bloc possesses and more than all its 16 states will be left with under the terms of the treaty. Their destruction would also cost a pretty penny. As would the conversion of tanks to tools of peaceful labor. Even if you do convert these swords into ploughshares, you will not take away their voracity, their weight and caterpillar tracks which strip off a fertile layer of the land. It is no coincidence that our diplomats in Vienna asked in alarm: Have people in Moscow seriously calculated the pluses and minuses of this conversion? While the West, although aware of our improvidence, is looking on in perplexity and suspicion: The Soviet Union has, after all, applied to convert 4,000 tanks.

In addition to the level of sufficiency, questions of naval aviation and inspection quotas present unresolved obstacles. That is a matter for separate comment. At present I must add that a strictly military approach may have a political impact on our relations with the new democracies in Eastern Europe. With a Soviet share of 40 percent, the six Warsaw Pact states would be left with only 10 percent. The NATO bloc has already doled out its half in Brussels, but the division of our half is generating hassles and political friction: The "older brother" is once again grabbing the lion's share. The first attempt at sharing out the arms two weeks ago in Bratislava failed to produce a result. At the end of last week representatives of the Warsaw Pact general staffs once again met in Prague—again to no avail.

I spoke in Vienna with the heads of the Polish and Hungarian delegations at the talks involving the 23 countries. For them the tank count runs predominantly to hundreds rather than thousands. Poland would like to keep 1,900, cutting back 1,400. Hungary agrees to 900 instead of 1000. Bulgaria requests 700 tanks which, by the way, is double Britain's share. Pointing out the "profound divergence" on this question, Polish delegation head W. Kanarski reproached Moscow for selfishness and disregarding the interests of its former allies which now have to think, given the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, how to independently ensure their own defense. "Because of your idea of sufficiency, we are deprived of sufficiency," he pointed out. He added the following comment: "You can move your arms back beyond the Urals, but we have nowhere to go with ours."

Hungary's Istvan Gyarmati also criticized the Soviet stance of "intending to help out." While fully understanding the "military idea" behind the demand for 40 percent, he does, however, consider it "politically incompatible with the idea of cooperative security in Europe."

The talks involving the 23 states in Vienna are taking place in a businesslike and proper, even friendly atmosphere. Work has been carried out over the past 18 months that could not have been conceived of a few

years ago in terms of its volume and results. The following comparison is telling: It was, after all, the Austrian capital that was the scene of a classic example of the interminable senseless confrontation known as the talks on mutual balanced reductions on arms in Central Europe. They lasted 15 years—and were totally fruitless. Things are different now. The states have reached the final stages of talks that were incomparably more complex after only 18 months. A great deal has been resolved. I am sure that the overall result will be successful. The faster the remaining obstacles are removed, the better.

BMEWS Radar System Described

90SV0103A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "A Bridle for 'Nuclear Racers,' or the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System"]

[Text] The reader seems to know that the United States and Canada have a joint system and a combined command for aerospace defense of the North American continent (NORAD). At the present time, NORAD performs functions not only of air defense but of space defense and antimissile defense as well, and also of warning of a missile attack.

But we journalists have not talked fully about the corresponding tasks of our Armed Forces (of course, not by choice), stating, for example, that the Air Defense Forces are intended only for combating air targets. But, you see, the structure of the Air Defense Forces organizationally includes strategic deterrence systems that are available in the USSR Armed Forces—the ballistic missile early warning system (SPRN) [BMEWS], the outer space verification system (SKKP), and the antiballistic missile (PRO) [ABM] defense system.

We offer for your consideration feature stories about strategic deterrence systems, whose installations our correspondent visited for the first time. Today's feature story is about the BMEWS system.

The panel was suddenly filled with a soft greenish light, and it displayed a row of figures. Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Marukhlenko, the operations duty officer for the long-range detection radar site, cast a troubled glance, and then relaxed immediately.

"Is that not the target you were looking for in the stillness of outer space?" I inquired.

"It is exactly the one. A space satellite is in the attention zone of our radar. For us, other objects are much more frightening—ballistic missiles. We must not let one 'get through...' and, as for the silence... There are more than 20,000 objects in outer space. Just in one day we follow 6,000 trajectories...."

It is interesting to listen to Lieutenant Colonel Marukhlenko. He is a professional, a person who loves his work.

"Very high responsibility prompts one to be professional," said V. Dudarev, unit chief of staff, with whom I came to the site's command post. "We are faced with a most complicated task—to provide the leadership of the country with reliable information on the possibility of the threat of an attack and on the missile-space situation. Take a look at our zone of responsibility. We encompass the Mediterranean Sea, and in addition... At any moment, missiles can be launched from submarines of the Lafayette type. Each has 16 "Poseidons" on board.

The life and service of missile attack warning specialists is compressed into seconds (missiles fly too fast). And not only at sites that are situated in Sevastopol, but also those that have found a home at Riga, Mukachevo, Mingeaur, Irkutsk, Balkhash, and Pechora.

The birth of this system is closely linked with the arms race. Nuclear missile attack systems and the use of outer space for military purposes could not help but entail the development of defensive systems. In the United States the construction of the first over-the-horizon radars (with a visibility of thousands of kilometers) of the future missile detection system began in 1958. In our country the first research work was accomplished three years later. Inasmuch as the only possible concept for the employment of a nuclear weapon by the United States was a massive nuclear missile strike, the main task was to detect the fact of a missile attack, although an estimate of the characteristics of the strike, its target direction, and scale was not required of the system. Another 15 years of intense work were needed for the BMEWS system to acquire today's character.

What does it represent? The first one in the harness is the outer space echelon. Duty satellites "do not take their eyes off" dangerous areas of land-based and sea-based missiles. But the capabilities of satellites, it was explained in the main headquarters of PVO Troops, are not unlimited. They "can see" missiles only in the boost phase, and more exactly, they can see the missile plume, because they lock onto the heat emissions of the jet engines. A little later, powerful radars are "harnessed"—the main means of detecting the fact of a nuclear missile attack. They can not only detect strategic missiles at distances of thousands of kilometers, but they can also model their flight trajectories in their missile-attack sectors.

Let us say that a station in Pechora or Sevastopol has attained a bearing on a dangerous target. Through information transmission routes a "fix" will immediately reach the command post of the BMEWS system, and there powerful, high-speed (several million operations per second) electronic computers process it and, when necessary, also instantly pass it to the Supreme High Command—the president of the USSR, no matter where he is, the General Staff, and the central command posts

of the services of the Armed Forces. And... the decision concerning a retaliatory strike follows.

None of us believes this, believes that a nuclear war will break out and that a general catastrophe will ensue, but here at the BMEWS facilities people have been "awaiting" a missile attack for years. In contacts with officers the question arose as to what motivates those who wait for a missile attack every day, every minute, every second. I raised this question with Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Frantishchik, the operations duty officer.

"You get a taste of alert duty days, you boil for a while in this hot water, and without fail the thought comes up as to whether anyone needs this kind of sacrifice.... Then you reflect a bit and you see: You earn your keep. You see, 'there,' hundreds of kilometers away, alert duty is also being performed, and it is being performed at a strategic missile control console."

Lieutenant Colonel Frantishchik, a typical representative of BMEWS units, got to know, as the saying goes, intense heat, freezing weather, sand, and the taiga. He served at a radar site in the east, in the north of the country, in the Baltics, and now in the south. And in all these years, with the exception of training periods in a radio-technical school and a military academy, the main thing in his life was alert duty.

Frantishchik feels that he ran into the most difficult situation during service in the north. "The radar screen flashed with interferences at that time," he explained. "For us this was an indication of the beginning of war. In peacetime, jamming of all technical systems is prohibited, including those of the enemy, which is reflected in the ABM Treaty. Of course, interference can arise accidentally. A jamming warning was immediately transmitted to all command posts, and we ourselves began to search for the cause of it. At that very moment an aircraft had taken off from Leningrad and passed not far from the radar site, and, perhaps, was to blame. It was immediately landed in Murmansk. All technical systems were checked—normal. It took off, and again there was interferences. It landed, but the interference continued, some kind of devilry. And here the thought began to creep in—was it not the enemy, going over to active jamming? And a little later it became clear to us—the interference was caused by our satellite, which was transmitting information to Earth with an unusual 'dancing' method. We called that day the day of 'the dance of the Black Prince'—he gave it to us hot, this prince."

There was no less an alarming situation in January 1982. A ballistic missile appeared in the zone of responsibility. It played on the nerves for the entire nine minutes of flight. Higher headquarters stated: The machine has a malfunction, there are no ballistic missiles in that sector with such characteristics. "A missile is in flight," Lieutenant Colonel Frantishchik insisted. Minutes passed, and it became clear that he was not mistaken. It was

Israel testing the "Jericho-2" ballistic missile," which has a firing range of up to 1,450 kilometers, in the radar zone of responsibility.

At the main headquarters of the PVO Troops, Colonel General of Aviation V. Kraskovskiy showed the locations of radar sites on a relief map. The sites of the existing system (incidentally, the Americans know about this very well) monitor missile-attack directions, in addition to the northeast. The Krasnoyarsk radar site was supposed to have closed a defense gap. But it is not the gap that has to be closed, but rather the Krasnoyarsk radar site. Why?

It is evident now that not everything was taken into account when the emplacement point was selected for the new radar site. It was hoped that "it will be in accord" with the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty. The reason that prompted settling on Krasnoyarsk is well known. It is too complicated to build on Chukotsk, for example.

U.S. specialists who visited the site reached a conclusion on the spot—the radar is not a violation of the ABM Treaty: It is deployed up to 1,000 km from the center of Europe, and it cannot be a part of the country's territorial ABM defense system. The experts were greatly surprised as to why we explained the technical characteristics, after the opinion set in in the world that the Krasnoyarsk radar is destabilizing the situation. Our radar became a trump card at the time of the publicity given by the United States to SDI, but, you see, it is a center for tracking space objects, nothing more, a link in the BMEWS system.

If the space-based and land-based echelons of the warning system function normally, the officers in the combat control center will correctly estimate the situation with a probability close to 1.0 even in extreme danger. A breakdown of one of the echelons of the warning system will lower the probability of a correct decision, and technical defects will bring it to a dangerous level. So what did the world gain with the closing of the Krasnoyarsk radar site?

And now it appears that the situation is being aggravated. By an order of the Council of Ministers, construction on the Mukachevo radar site has been stopped. Passions around the installation under construction were inflamed a long time ago: It is said that the electromagnetic flow will have a negative impact on the population, and that the site will take a large amount of water, leaving people on a hunger ration, etc. There is even agreement on the fact that there is a nuclear reactor at the site.

The last suppositions bordered on the absurd (residents of Transcarpathia were convinced of this—they were incited with the object of inflaming the sociopolitical situation), but regarding the electromagnetic flow... But here it is the military that is to blame, and more precisely, the system of secrecy. It was under its cover that the negative psychological mood of the population was formed.

Radars like the ones we are talking about are based on the territories of various states. For example, six of them are situated on the continental United States, and, moreover, in heavily populated areas. The permissible medical norms of electromagnetic flux for Americans are 10 times higher than in our country. But nobody is holding rallies there. And all because local authorities, jointly with the military, conduct explanatory work in a timely way.

It seems that the residents of Transcarpathia would assess steps taken to reduce the electromagnetic flux with understanding, if they are undertaken in a timely and public way. And there was this kind of opportunity—owing to engineering-technical decisions. It is only now (in areas of other radars) that verification groups are being set up that are equipped with technical systems (laboratories on wheels), which will be joined by representatives of the local population. Medical certificates are being drawn up in which all the parameters and characteristics of the electromagnetic flux will be reflected. The concerns of the people for ecological safety are understandable, especially since a majority of the population does not argue against the importance of the sites.

But the Mukachevo radar site is being mothballed, and its predecessor is obsolete and performing limited tasks. Is a new gap appearing in the BMEWS system? We should not commit another blunder.

The BMEWS system has other problems too. Thus, the people at the radar site that I visited on assignment, who are proud of the fact that the unit collective was decorated with the pennant of the Minister of Defense for courage and military valor, are troubled by the quality of today's call-up and training of specialists.... Or there is the housing problem. One-fourth of the officers are not provided housing. Families of four are huddled together in rooms that are nine square meters in size. Is it possible to rest after alert duty under these conditions?

...The world is on the threshold of changes. A whole class of Soviet and U.S. missiles is being destroyed. Not far off is the signing of an agreement on a 50 percent reduction of strategic weapons. At the beginning of July, the heads of states and governments of NATO proposed to the member states of the Warsaw Pact to solemnly proclaim that the unions are no longer enemies. Yes, the world is changing, but... The nuclear racers—upgraded ballistic missiles with multiple warheads—MX, and "Trident-2," are still not bridled. And then... Eight states are standing at the "nuclear threshold," and they are waiting to step across it at any moment. By the end of the century the number of those possessing nuclear missile weapons might reach 20. Will the danger become less? Consequently, the brakes must be applied against a nuclear catastrophe.

Swedish Defense Minister on European Security

*PM0310135890 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Sep 90 First Edition pp 1, 3*

[Unattributed report followed by interview with Swedish Defense Minister R. Carlsson by Major M. Zhiglov in Moscow on 26 September: "On a Tour of the Country"]

[Text] On 27 September, Swedish Defense Minister R. Carlsson, who is in our country on an official visit, left for a tour of the country.

The guest and those accompanying him were seen off at the airport by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, member of the Presidential Council and USSR defense minister; Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and first deputy defense minister; Colonel General of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, USSR deputy defense minister; and other generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Among those accompanying him was O. Berner, Swedish ambassador to the USSR.

The Swedish and Soviet state flags were raised at the airport, a guard of honor was lined up on the airfield, and the national anthems of the two countries were sung.

On the same day, R. Carlsson arrived in Murmansk.

On the eve of his departure, R. Carlsson answered a number of questions put to him by a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent.

[Zhiglov] Mr. Carlsson, today the question of creating a collective security system in Europe is more acute than ever before. What role could Sweden play in this process?

[Carlsson] I will venture to say that for a long time Sweden has been a kind of stabilizing factor on the European continent. We are a neutral country and we intend to carry on pursuing this policy. I believe that this is an important and decisive contribution to the collective security system.

[Zhiglov] Swedish politicians have repeatedly stressed that one of the most important tasks in national foreign policy is the active support of efforts in the sphere of disarmament. What takes priority here? In particular, what is your attitude to the creation of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe?

[Carlsson] From Sweden's viewpoint, the development of events in Europe is proceeding in a positive direction. And this process must be strengthened and developed. As far as the question of a nuclear-free zone is concerned, the five northern countries have been discussing this idea at official level for a number of years. And as far as I know, a proposal on this problem will soon be proclaimed by the Scandinavian countries.

[Zhiglov] How would you comment on the current state of Soviet-Swedish relations in the military sphere?

[Carlsson] Contacts between military people have been extended in the past five years. For example, there has been an exchange of visits between the commanders of branches of Armed Forces. A few months after my trip to Moscow, the commander in chief of the Swedish Armed Forces will visit the Soviet Union. So you cannot say by any means that relations in the military sphere between our countries are bad.

[Zheglov] In this connection are any meetings planned between Soviet and Swedish draftees or officers?

[Carlsson] There are no such plans.

[Zheglov] This year the Soviet Union will withdraw the last submarine with nuclear ballistic missiles from the Baltic Fleet....

[Carlsson] This is marvelous. Sweden has at various forums always advocated the reduction of naval weapons.

[Zheglov] While we are on the subject of submarines... The mass media have frequently raised the question of secret submarines violating Sweden's territorial waters, repeatedly stressing that they can only belong to the USSR. What can you say on this subject?

[Carlsson] I regularly comment on such reports. The commander in chief of the Armed Forces keeps me informed of events. But he has not reported that they were Soviet submarines.

U.S. Commentators Cited on START Difficulties

'Key Problems' Hinder Accord

PM2709153590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent A. Shalnev: "Hopes and Difficulties. Soviet and U.S. Representatives Continue Discussing Disputed Problems of the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty"]

[Text] New York—An article by commentators R. Evans and R. Novak appeared Wednesday in dozens of U.S. newspapers, including the capital's WASHINGTON POST. It made a highly pessimistic assessment of the prospects for a rapid conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive arms [START]. The commentators maintain that the timetable set for signing the treaty will not be observed, because there is little chance of settling several key problems which are hindering the document's final elaboration.

The strategic offensive arms treaty was precisely one of the topics which Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker discussed at their Wednesday meeting in New York. According to reports from sources, both the Soviet and the U.S. delegations paint roughly the same picture of the state of affairs at the strategic arms talks.

Many fundamental problems have been resolved. But quite a lot of difficulties remain, as can be judged from the fact that something in the order of 10-15 percent of the text of the treaty and the closely related documents, to use the term employed by the talks participants, is still "enclosed within parentheses," i.e. it has not been specified or agreed on. The text itself runs to over 500 pages.

According to some assessments, something in the order of 60 different questions, chiefly of a technical nature, are still to be resolved. Such as, for example: How are missiles to be marked to facilitate their subsequent monitoring? Soviet missiles are housed in containers, which is a feature of their design. U.S. missiles are not. The U.S. delegation proposes marking the "body" of the missiles, while we propose marking the containers.

But a total of 12 different kinds of inspection, including so-called inspections on suspicion, will be covered in the treaty. Other technical problems—also as yet unresolved—include problems of telemetry and problems of locating the signals "emitted" by a missile during tests.

There are complexities of a different level. They are political or military-political. They relate, in particular, to how many of the aircraft which the West calls "Back-fire" the Soviet Union will be permitted to have. Until recently we insisted on 600, the Americans on 450. As far as I understand it, the Soviet minister gave a new figure at his Wednesday meeting with J. Baker of 550. The Americans are now thinking about it.

There is still the problem of preventing the treaty from being violated by roundabout means—for example, by supplying prohibited arms to Third World countries. In THE WASHINGTON POST, article commentators Evans and Novak write that, by referring to "noncircumvention," the Soviet Union would like to prevent the United States from fulfilling the long-promised delivery of Trident-2 missiles to Britain. This is not so. According to information which I have received, the problem is not the Trident-2's but the prevention of any future deliveries over and above the Tridents. The sides are now engaged in seeking acceptable wordings for a future ban.

Contacts are being maintained not only and not so much at the level of ministers but, above all, at the level of experts. For example, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Karpov has just met with Under Secretary of State R. Bartholomew in Washington—and will meet him again in New York. It is quite feasible that by the end of this series of meetings Moscow and Washington will be able to announce progress in preparing the strategic offensive arms treaty. It is also quite possible that the treaty will be ready precisely by the time which the Soviet and U.S. leaders were talking about earlier—by the new year.

Tremendous work has already been done. And it will be distressing and unforgivable if, for any reason at all, it is canceled out.

Noncircumvention, Backfire, SS-18

*LD2709203990 Moscow TASS in English 2027 GMT
27 Sep 90*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, September 27 (TASS)—Reports appeared in the U.S. press that new difficulties arose at the Geneva talks on strategic offensive arms. Observers of THE WASHINGTON POST Rowland Evans and Robert Novak assert that the chances to settle differences before the end of this year are now lower than ever.

Three problems that remain unresolved are mentioned.

The U.S. side insists on its right to transfer strategic arms to allies, specifically, "Trident-2" sea-launched missiles. The U.S. side reasons that the United States has already signed an agreement with Britain about equipping the British Navy with contemporary missile systems. The Soviet Union insists that such transfers be banned.

The U.S. stance on the right of transfer of strategic arms to allies is, perhaps, the West's most sincere stake at unilateral military advantages, made at the talks. This would mean that instead of destroying weapons systems under the treaty, the United States would hand them over to its allies, disrupting East-West balance of forces. Besides that, the adoption of the U.S. proposal would lessen the overall scopes of arms elimination.

There are differences as to whether the Soviet bomber Tu-22M, described in the West as "Backfire," should be classed with strategic or with non-strategic arms. There are differences in assessing the plane's range.

Americans insist that this is a strategic plane, that it is capable to take off from the Soviet territory, reach the continental part of the United States and return to the airfield from which it took off.

The Soviet side denies that Tu-22M has such potentialities. It is said that striving to settle the dispute, the Soviet negotiator once suggested that chief U.S. negotiator General Rowny make a flight on board the plane from any airfield in the USSR to Washington and back. The American general politely declined the proposal.

The third problem, regarding SS-18 missiles, cropped up at the talks unexpected for many observers. Just a few months back, high-ranking representatives of the U.S. Department of State publicly declared that limitations on the number and the mode of basing of these missiles coordinated back in 1987 suit the purposes of the U.S. arms control policy. Indeed, all concerns of the U.S. side regarding SS-18 missiles have been removed.

Many U.S. specialists even said that the question of SS-18 missiles was removed.

Now the U.S. side insists on new restrictions on these Soviet missiles. Specialists believe that these restrictions will lead to "natural death" of the remaining part of these systems within a relatively short period of time.

The problem of SS-18 missiles has become the stumbling block at the negotiations. Who is to blame? Some American diplomats say that the impasse was created by Soviet generals who have no wish to part from these missiles.

This is a deliberate distortion of facts. Washington is apparently striving to disrupt the arrangements on SS-18 missiles agreed upon in 1987 and to achieve unilateral military advantages. This explains the deadlock at the Geneva negotiations.

To propose the revision of the almost completed agreement means to drag out the negotiations and to jeopardize the signing of the agreement on strategic arms within a certain timeframe agreed upon by the sides—by the end of 1990.

'Substantial' Progress on CFE Reported

*PM2809183590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by correspondent A. Shalnev: "USSR-United States: Substantial Progress Made"]

[Text] New York—"Tell me," I asked the high-ranking State Department staffer, "to what extent do you take into account the reports from Moscow? Do these reports influence your position at the current meetings with the Soviet foreign minister and his delegation?"

"We are not in the habit of paying particular attention to rumors. For a year now we have been hearing that Ryzhkov is going to resign. We have also heard a great many times that Gorbachev also is going to go."

"Did the question of these reports arise in any form during Baker's meetings with Shevardnadze?"

"No."

"What about the meetings between the Soviet and U.S. experts who are now accompanying Shevardnadze and Baker?"

"Experts do not discuss such questions at all."

My enquiry to the State Department, which now, during the first days of the UN General Assembly session, has effectively decamped from Washington to New York, was no accident. In recent days U.S. newspapers have been full of articles which, citing all kinds of sources in Moscow and other cities, express suppositions about the likelihood of an abrupt turn of events in the Soviet Union.

But neither the speculation nor the suppositions were discussed at the meetings between the Soviet and U.S. ministers and their advisers. The discussion was about something else. On Thursday, Shevardnadze and Baker almost exclusively discussed problems of reducing conventional forces and armaments in Europe.

There are new developments. Substantial progress has been made on two of the three key problems. As a high-ranking representative of the Soviet delegation put it in conversation with me, "We have managed not to cut but to untie the Gordian knot and to make a breakthrough on the road to Paris." As is well known, it is proposed to sign the treaty on conventional types of arms in Paris in mid-November.

One of these problems is the "sufficiency problem." The point at issue is what should be the level of arms for NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the categories of tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, and artillery and what should be the level of arms in the same categories for each individual country. Crudely speaking, this means that, say, the USSR does not have the right to have more than 30 or maybe 40 percent of the total number of tanks or helicopters permitted in the geographical area from the Atlantic to the Urals. It is these levels that have to be agreed.

On Thursday, after almost 24 hours' debate at the expert level, the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state at last reached an understanding and thus solved a problem without which it would be impossible to hope for the conclusion of the treaty as a whole. For the moment both our side and the Americans prefer not to mention specific figures relating to the agreed levels.

The second agreed problem is the "zones problem." As the high-ranking Soviet representative told me, an understanding has been reached on a "regional division in Europe, an understanding which would preclude the possibility of dangerous concentrations of arms in one region and would ensure a balance of forces in each separate subregion of Europe." I will not go into detail—that is a matter for experts. I will merely say that the "zones problem" ranks second in importance after the "sufficiency problem."

The third problem—the aircraft problem—has not yet been solved, although I was told that there has been some progress. But something else was also made clear: If no accord is reached, the agreement as a whole that is due to be signed in Paris will not be jeopardized. The agreement can be concluded, I was told, on the understanding that the sides will return to the topic of aircraft at the next talks, during the second phase of the process of reducing forces and armaments in Europe.

Admittedly, no one is ruling out the possibility that a solution will also be found right here in New York so far as aircraft are concerned—primarily ground-based naval aviation.

Kondrashov Assesses Atmosphere for Vienna Talks

*PM3009132190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 5*

["Political Observer's Opinion" by Stanislav Kondrashov: "En Route to the Finish"]

[Text] Vienna-Moscow—This week the Pentagon announced that U.S. troops stationed in Europe will be cut by 40,000 men by the end of 1991. The United States has a total of 300,000 ground and air forces on the European continent. This means that the reduction affects 13 percent of officers and men. This is unprecedented in the whole 40-plus years of NATO's existence. But this abrupt turnaround has not attracted much attention or surprise. Although you would think that we in the Soviet Union had long been waiting for it.

Why is this? First, of course, because we are absorbed with our own affairs, floundering around in our deep crisis. If they are going, then good luck to them. And they may be going not back home but to the Persian Gulf, where the threat of military conflict is far more acute than in Europe. Second, for all its historic symbolism, the decision announced by U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney is very, very logical and natural. Moreover, it is already somewhat belated. The figure of 40,000 was part of the mutual mechanism for armed forces and arms cuts begun back in December 1987 by the Washington Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. People heard this and were amazed that the process was starting, until they got used to it. Later, M.S. Gorbachev announced in his December 1988 speech at the United Nations a unilateral 10-percent cut in Soviet Armed Forces—without, admittedly, stating the total number involved (this was still a secret at the time). The Americans did not know whether to believe the seriousness of Soviet intentions or not, and this was seen initially in the cautious wait-and-see approach adopted by the Bush administration, which replaced the Reagan administration in January 1989.

Nowadays all this is ancient history. The sharpest turnaround and breakthrough occurred in the East European countries at the end of last year. People then started to believe it was serious, if not irreversible just yet. What are 40,000 U.S. troops if the Soviet Union, under pressure from the new Hungarian and Czechoslovak Governments, is pushing ahead with the withdrawal of 125,000 of its own soldiers who had been "temporarily" kept in those countries—for 30 and 20 or so years respectively? What are 40,000 troops when a united Germany makes a commitment to retain just 370,000 soldiers instead of the current 500,000 on the West German side and more than 100,000 on the East German side? That is almost a 50-percent cut.

Thus the arithmetic of confrontation is changing with the changing picture of Europe. It has become banal to note that events are ahead of the negotiating process. The peoples are urging their leaders and diplomats on, making amendments to their agreements. Only this February the USSR and the United States agreed on lowered ceilings for the numbers of their armed forces in Europe outside their national territories—195,000 each plus another 30,000 for the Americans. This Ottawa agreement reflected an idea that has also been overtaken by events. Under new agreements all Soviet troops (around 400,000) are to be withdrawn from German

territory by late 1994. If you add Poland—where we will also be starting to withdraw—and, in the very near future, Germany to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, within four years there will not be a single Soviet soldier in Europe outside Soviet borders. It might even happen sooner. After all, the new Germany is not the allied socialist GDR, and the new environment will probably create a growing impetus for withdrawal.

Why then does Washington need 225,000 armed Americans in Europe? The military necessity for it is gradually receding, and NATO's necessary political links could be ensured by a smaller number of troops. Surely 70,000-80,000 would do? O.A. Grinevskiy, head of the Soviet delegation, recently decided to air this idea at the 23d round of the Vienna talks. However, it was not favorably received by Washington or its representatives in Vienna. They are just as unable to keep up with the development of the situation as we are—something I stated in my first commentary from Vienna ("The Difficult Farewell to Tanks," IZVESTIYA No. 268). And the future—that of the Soviet Union and its policy—does not seem unambiguous to them, given the centrifugal forces building up in our country.

Following the "cold war" stagnation, perestroika is under way in Europe along East-West lines. And it is proceeding so quickly that it is hard to predict its end results or to make them part of treaty commitments. The problem of ceilings for armed forces personnel in the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries has not yet been discussed at all at the 23d round of talks: We will have to wait for the dust to settle from the changes currently under way. In May 1989 President Bush proposed including this question on the agenda for the talks, yet at the NATO session this July he asked for it to be "excluded." It has now been decided by common consent to move the question of armed forces numbers to Vienna-2—that is, to the new talks which should start soon after the signing of the treaty currently in preparation and deepen it.

Apart from ceilings on personnel, Vienna-2 could also take over other disputes such as the question of naval aviation—U.S. deck-borne aircraft, which Washington does not want to count, and Soviet land-based aircraft, which Moscow is prepared to count only in conjunction with the U.S. deck-borne aircraft. It could take over these issues if it is not possible to resolve them within the now severely limited timetable of Vienna-1: After all, a treaty should be completed within the next few weeks for signing at the Paris summit of the top leaders of the states party to the all-European process. In New York Shevardnadze and Baker are currently clearing up Vienna-1 and transferring all the questions outstanding to Vienna-2. This clearing up process will also continue in the next few days at the meeting of the 35 states' foreign ministers.

I view New York as someone who returned from Vienna a week ago. The information I gathered among the Vienna negotiators could age rapidly in New York as

new political solutions and policy breakthroughs occur. In particular, I was told that in the heat of perestroika that has seized the top echelons of the state administration, Moscow has not always sent instructions to its delegation in Vienna in good time, which has sometimes slowed the talks. Many people said this—both outright and by implication. The "Westerners" have been conjecturing about the new decisionmaking mechanism within the USSR President's staff, which has replaced the Politburo they were used to. Among the Soviet delegation the complaint was that it is sometimes hard to get the necessary official information out of Moscow—on the results of past Shevardnadze-Baker meetings, for instance. Has chaos really come to the skyscraper on Smolenskaya-Sennaya Square [USSR Foreign Ministry building]?

Nonetheless, the main thing is the impression of the speed of events. For me it is strengthened still further when I remember my first encounter with the talks on conventional forces in Europe. That was in February-March 1988. The talks had not yet begun, the mandate for them was then being discussed in Vienna. Then, after Vienna, I visited the headquarters of the Soviet Group of Forces in the GDR and a front-line tank division. Our troops, of course, were not preparing to leave back then. The divisional commander showed me a map. On their side, the deployments of Bundeswehr and NATO units and formations were indicated, while on our side everything was covered in the usual veil of obscurity. A small detail, but a memorable one.

Now that the treaty is almost ready, you can see its scale and uniqueness. Tanks, various types of armored vehicles, artillery systems, combat helicopters, and aircraft are to be cut. Naturally, they will be cut to equal ceilings for the two blocs. But the reduction will be incomparably deeper for the Soviet Union because, unfortunately, we had amassed more deadly paraphernalia than anyone else. A reduction on this scale removes, even at the Vienna-1 stage, the frighteningly offensive aspect of the many years of military confrontation in Europe.

The trailblazer which rehearsed the effectiveness of verification for the first time was the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. But it affected just two rather than 23 countries (or, rather, 22 countries after the unification of Germany on 3 October). Only around 4,000 missiles and launchers were subject to monitoring and elimination. The Vienna treaty embraces around 120,000 different weapons over 5 million square km of the USSR's European territory and 3 million square km of "their" territory. This is the first time in history that the Soviet Union has opened its borders so extensively. And verification will reach right down from the military district and army headquarters to regiments and battalions. Whereas only a few dozen installations on our territory were to be inspected under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, now the number to be inspected will be more than 1,500.

However much people may accuse some of our generals of a "siege mentality" in their adherence to old thinking, over the past two to two-and-one-half years glasnost has made giant strides in the military sphere. International treaties now permit things that would previously have been considered high treason. "Attitudes to us are changing for the better. People are starting to believe us. They have become very candid. We are not the only ones making concessions, they are changing their positions too." This assessment means a lot when it comes from someone who participated in the preparations for the Vienna talks and, ideologically, should be among the most intransigent section of our delegation—Major General V.M. Tatarnikov.

They believe us, but there are still arguments about inspection quotas. The NATO people would like to review up to 35-40 percent of the Soviet installations liable to inspection every year, we are proposing a maximum of 15 percent. Fifteen percent (this represents almost 250 installations) to monitor the initial data before the treaty comes into force, 10 percent in each of the three years when the arms cuts are to take place, another 15 percent for the six months when the levels set by the treaty are to be monitored, and, finally, 10 percent for a subsequent open-ended period—the treaty itself will be of unlimited duration. That represents thousands and thousands of "group-days"—it seems that military inspectors from the NATO countries will become an abiding part of our current pluralistic scenery.

Believe it or not, the reason being advanced by the Soviet delegation for the more modest verification than our partners are insisting on is not residual secrecy, but just plain economics. Inspections are expensive. The more of them there are, the higher the cost—and the bulk of the expense is to be borne by the host country.

Paradoxically, arms cuts are likely to involve additional spending. This will be required immediately, whereas the "peace dividends"—in the form of reduced defense spending and the resultant conversion of the military-industrial complex—will come later. And not to everyone—only to the patient, the intelligent, and the skillful.

Bogachev Wants Chemical Arms Talks Accelerated

*LD0210232290 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1620 GMT 2 Oct 90*

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, 2 October (TASS)—The Persian Gulf crisis highlights yet again the pressing need for an immediate solution to a complete ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks worldwide, with a reliable monitoring mechanism.

Iraq, which used poisonous substances in the field during the war with Iran, clearly states today that there is a possibility of a chemical war in the Near East.

In New York, both U.S. President George Bush and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze have come out with statements on the need to accelerate the process of reaching an agreement on chemical weapons.

For several years now in Geneva, the unhurried discussions on chemical weapons by delegations from forty states have been continuing. When the routine round of talks ends, the diplomats from the countries participating in the conference on disarmament have, as a rule, solemnly announced that the current year will be the year that a complete ban on toxic substances in the field is reached. Although such statements were made in 1987, 1988, and 1989, there is still no convention on a chemical weapons ban. There is only another promise from the diplomats that now it will be in 1990 that such a convention will most certainly be signed. Actually, a large part of the draft convention has already been agreed upon, however, the menacing development of events in the international arena shows that the present rates at which the talks in Geneva are progressing are obviously inadequate.

There was a time when the United States stopped producing chemical weapons, and the Soviet Union did not follow the U.S. example. Then the countries exchanged roles: the USSR stopped the conveyor belt producing toxic chemical agents, and the U.S. quickly started producing fundamentally new chemical binary ammunition. Now, as it appears, a common position of two great powers on toxic chemical agents has been devised.

Very important bilateral consultations between the USSR and the U.S. are taking place in parallel with the conference on disarmament. The problems of chemical weapons are invariably included in the agenda of the USSR-U.S. summits. In June this year, the USSR and the U.S. reached an agreement on ending the production of chemical weapons. The U.S. started to remove its chemical ammunition from FRG territory to Johnston Atoll, in the Pacific. As is well known, the Soviet Union does not have any chemical weapons outside the boundaries of its national territory. A USSR-U.S. accord was reached on the stage-by-stage elimination of 98 percent of the stocks of toxic chemical agents of both countries, and then of all the stocks if other countries possessing this weapon sign the treaty.

The new approaches to problems of war and peace which have become possible as a result of the triumph of the ideas of new political thinking, and the cessation of production of toxic chemical agents in the USSR and the U.S., create conditions for outlawing these weapons.

Time does not tolerate any further delay in settling this matter. The participants in the Geneva disarmament conference must now redouble their efforts to free mankind at last forever from the threat of a devastating chemical war.

Troop Withdrawal From CSFR To Finish by Mid-1991*PM0210150790 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 2 Oct 90 First Edition p 3*

[TASS report: "Soviet Troop Withdrawal Goes On"]

[Text] Prague, 1 October—Three military trains have crossed the border in the region of the Slovak city of Cierna-nad-Tisou and Chop in the Ukraine. A sizeable proportion of the garrison quartered in the central Slovak city of Zvolen has now returned to the Soviet Union.

Since the beginning of the year, a total of 402 trains carrying Soviet military servicemen and combat hardware have crossed the border in this region. Over 50 percent of the personnel of Soviet units stationed on Czechoslovak territory have now left the country, CTK reports. It is noted that 70 percent of tanks and artillery pieces and 80 percent of aircraft have now left the country. The Soviet troop withdrawal will be completed by the middle of next year.

Accords Leading to Paris CSCE Summit Viewed*LD0310190490 Moscow TASS in English 1806 GMT
3 Oct 90*

[By TASS political writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, October 3 (TASS)—A decision has been made to convene a summit of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), involving the heads of state and government of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada, in Paris on November 19-21, 1990.

This exceptionally important forum will take place largely thanks to the understandings reached by James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze in the field of conventional force reductions in Europe and at the meetings of all foreign ministers of the countries participating in the Vienna talks.

Most observers and participants in the talks on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) are known to have expressed serious concern over the state of things in Vienna. Differences on several fundamental issues were holding up progress there.

It seemed that the stalemate could not be broken. At the same time, Washington did not agree to go to the Paris summit without a treaty on conventional forces in Europe that would be ready for signature.

The statement by the Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers that the time had come to complete the elaboration of the treaty by the time of the Paris summit signalled a genuine breakthrough.

Why has this promising forecast been made? First and foremost, because solutions were found to such important problems as a treaty for each group of states on the remaining levels of tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and helicopters. Sufficiency ceilings (the maximum level of armaments) were established for each country separately.

As solutions to many problems, which caused the Vienna talks to skid, were found, a system of European security begins to come into view, under which a balance of armed forces would be maintained not only in the entire area from the Atlantic to the Urals, but also in each separate region of the continent, for instance, in Central Europe, in the "rear" and on the northern and southern "flanks." Criteria are under development that would rule out the dangerous concentration of troops in any of the European sub-regions.

Life introduced substantive changes into the military-political situation in Europe and talks clearly found themselves lagging behind developments, which complicated the negotiating process.

Specialists have estimated that the unification of the two Germanys, the eventual transition of the former German Democratic Republic from one military-political bloc to the other, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union's commitment to abolish its Western Group of troops within three to four years changes the correlation of forces in the West's favour by a factor of two to one.

The task was to take into account these changes and to make sure that the treaty be mindful of the realities. Luckily, the efforts succeeded—the sides found mutually acceptable solutions.

Are there any other disputable issues? Yes, solutions were not found for all problems. But their number is not so large as to banish the possibility of accomplishing the task set—to bring to logical fruition the elaboration of the treaty before the Paris summit.

Last Baltic Nuclear-Missile Sub Decommissioned*LD0310234990 Moscow Domestic Service
in Russian 2200 GMT 3 Oct 90*

[Text] A report from the double-Red-Banner-holding Baltic Fleet: Captain First Rank Nekrasov was the last to leave his vessel after lowering the naval flag on it. From that moment the diesel submarine bearing the number 467 which used to carry a complex of ballistic missiles is considered to have been removed from the USSR's Navy. This submarine was the last one in the Baltic capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Thus, the promise by the Soviet leadership to eliminate nuclear weapons carriers in this maritime area has been fulfilled. The promise was given by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev last autumn in Helsinki.

The naval submarine has been disarmed, the crew disbanded and the naval flag of the vessel, which maintained its watch in the world oceans for 30 years, will take its honored place in a museum.

Sino-Soviet Talks on Arms Reductions Reviewed

*LD0410090590 Moscow TASS in English 0849 GMT
4 Oct 90*

[Text] Moscow, October 4 (TASS)—Delegations from the Soviet Union and China held the first round of talks on mutual reductions in the Armed Forces and confidence building measures on the Sino-Soviet border in Moscow between September 10-28, it was officially announced here today.

The talks were held in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere. The sides agreed to continue talks and hold the next round in Beijing.

The Chinese delegation was received by Soviet Deputy Foreign Ministers Viktor Karpov and Igor Rogachev and deputy head of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff Vladimir Denisov.

The delegation visited a number of military institutions and units in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Panels Recommend Adopting Nuclear Test Treaties

*LD0410175890 Moscow TASS in English 1738 GMT
4 Oct 90*

[Text] Moscow, October 4 (TASS)—The Soviet parliamentary Committee on Defence and State Security and the Committee on International Affairs met in Moscow today to discuss ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and peaceful underground nuclear explosions.

After studying corresponding documents and hearing reports by officials from the Soviet Foreign and Defence Ministries, the committees decided to recommend that the Soviet parliament ratify the two treaties and corresponding protocols.

Bogachev Considers Outlook for CFE Progress

*LD0410210890 Moscow TASS in English 2045 GMT
4 Oct 90*

["Comment" by TASS military analyst Vladimir Bogachev: "Progress on Conventional Arms Cuts"]

[Text] Moscow, October 4 (TASS)—Good news has come from New York. Visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker have reached mutually acceptable decisions on a number of issues that were raised during the Vienna talks. This has opened the way towards the signing of a treaty on conventional weapons cuts in Europe.

According to the treaty, which is due to be signed in Paris in mid-November, tens of thousands of tanks and artillery systems and thousands of combat aircraft will be scrapped or withdrawn from Europe. The NATO and Warsaw Pact troops in Europe will be reduced by ten percent.

According to experts, as a result of the implementation of the new treaty, Western and Eastern forces in Europe will be balanced.

The headway made in New York removes the last obstacle to holding a 35-state summit Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Paris in mid-November.

Only a few days ago, serious apprehension was voiced that the summit would have to be postponed if the draft treaty on conventional forces were not ready by mid-November. Now, it can be said with confidence that the treaty on conventional forces will be fully prepared in time for the Paris summit.

The progress in solving the problems debated in Vienna will facilitate the success of the Paris forum, which, it is believed in Moscow, will in turn create conditions for reducing still further the level of military confrontation in Europe and lead to the creation of new security structures on the continent.

The way towards a common European home, towards turning Europe into a continent of lasting peace and cooperation is not likely to be simple and easy. As soon as the problem of conventional weapons is resolved, other, more complex problems will move to the foreground. What is to be done with military alliances in Europe? What functions should they perform, if any?

Profound transformations are now under way in the Warsaw Treaty structures. It is becoming a consultative political organisation. NATO member-countries are also considering ways to strengthen political aspects of the Western alliance.

Two dissimilar tendencies are becoming manifest in deciding future roles to be played by the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

NATO leaders insist on "immutable fundamental tasks" of the alliance, which have until recently been purely military. Judging by their pronouncements, their alliance should remain the principle peace and stability keeping instrument in Europe. Any non-military structures, like the CSCE or the United Nations, should play only an auxiliary role. On the other hand, the Soviet Union favours a much greater role for the CSCE in solving European problems.

During the past five years, stormy political processes in Europe have often run ahead of the decision making process in negotiations and confronted participants in international fora with faits accomplis.

However, this only reconfirms the thesis of the need to define general prospects for European development towards a durable peace and stability.

The forthcoming Paris summit is expected to impart a new powerful impulse to these efforts.

CSFR Defense Official Updates Soviet Withdrawal

*LD0410201890 Moscow TASS in English 1916 GMT
4 Oct 90*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Beskromnyy]

[Text] Bratislava, October 4 (TASS)—A total of 56 per cent of Soviet troops and their families have left Czechoslovakia. "The troop withdrawal plan is fulfilled in

accordance with the agreement between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia and we strive to speed up its implementation," Major General Svetozar Nadovic of the Czechoslovak Defence Ministry told a meeting of the Slovak Civil Defence Staff today.

By year's end the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from Komarno and Nova Zamki and will pull out part of a military garrison from Sljac, he said.

He denied reports that Soviet soldiers were selling arms, describing them as "provocative rumours by our people who were interested in buying these weapons".

Most Soviet military facilities will be handed over to the Czechoslovak Army, he said.

AUSTRIA

Army Commander Surveys Strategic Environment

90EN0854A Vienna OESTERREICHISCHE
MILITAERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT in German
Jul/Aug 90 pp 277-280

[Article by [Gen.] Othmar Tauschitz [troop inspector general of the Austrian Army (retired since the publication of this article)]: "The European Situation and Disarmament From the Austrian Perspective"]

[Text] Peace cannot be achieved through disarmament, because disarmament is a consequence of peace, not its cause.

As long as sensitive internal conflict among nationalities is an issue in Kosovo, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Transylvania, the Baltic states, and Moldavia, and we in Austria are forced to turn away asylum-seekers, we cannot be certain whether future conflicts may assume international proportions as well.

Recent developments in Europe over the past decade, beginning in Poland, brought with them a multitude of events that have intensified more and more over the course of the last year in particular. At present, the states of Europe are undergoing a phase of hectic, nonviolent conflict settlement. At the moment, this includes the German reunification question, linked to uncertainty about drawing the borders in the east and about economic aid, Hungarian-Romanian efforts to resolve nationality problems, the emergence of a Slovak tendency to distance itself from the federation, and so on. Even Hungarian memories of the old map of the region and of that nation's major losses of territory could be revived.

The Bratislava summit of 9 April 1990 merits special attention; there, Vaclav Havel proclaimed a European security conference of the CSCE member-states, in part with the idea that the CSFR should become a link between an Adriatic and a Baltic community of states.

Besides the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe (VVSBM) and the parallel Negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (VKSE), both in Vienna, the following subjects are being negotiated through special meetings in individual European cities:

- European economic cooperation, in Bonn.
- Environmental protection, in Sofia.
- The problem of the Mediterranean area, in Palma de Mallorca.
- The Information Forum, concerning the freedom of trans-border information, in London.
- The symposium on cultural heritage in Europe, in Krakow.

—The meeting on questions with a human dimension (i.e., human rights), in Copenhagen.

—The experts' meeting on peaceful conflict resolution, in La Valetta.

At the moment, we Europeans are so preoccupied with ourselves that we are running the risk of forgetting the rest of the world.

Wherever it has been possible in past decades to end one of the numerous violent conflicts through great efforts, this has generally happened only in the form of a cease-fire, and has thus been subject to retraction, and often accompanied by the deployment of arbitration forces from the United Nations. This includes the deployment of Austrian contingents in the Golan Heights, in Cyprus, in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, where thus far 30,000 Austrian soldiers have been deployed. A cease-fire is not the same thing as peace—especially if it has to be laboriously maintained by referees. Furthermore, it is characterized by a continual increase and improvement of the arms potential of the parties to the conflict. We know this from what we have observed.

Perhaps we are not sufficiently aware of the fact that this worldwide method for quelling conflicts continually costs money, which the members of the United Nations—and thus we Austrians as well—must come up with. Thus, we too have a legitimate interest in keeping these conflicts under the escalation threshold, meaning that we project them onto our own security, since otherwise the money would be a total waste. After all, it is the taxpayers' money!

From the two world wars we know how far conflicts can spread, and for that reason we should not feel safe from any source of conflict, regardless of how far away it may be.

Thus, world peace clearly has not broken out. This means that there can be no Europe disarmed all the way down to the zero level as long as the potential for armament exists throughout the world, and this potential is in fact considerable.

The show of force by Saddam Husayn should be a warning to us insofar as the missiles that he is developing have ranges with which a further round of fighting could take place in the Middle East involving the use of chemical or even nuclear weapons.

It is also impossible to rule out the possibility that the still-unresolved North-South conflict will be intensified by the economic undertow caused by the opening up of a needy Eastern Europe, a conflict that could be reflected initially in increased terrorist activity and even oil boycotts against the highly developed and thus especially susceptible industrial states. Furthermore, one cannot rule out the long-term possibility that a defensive community will prove necessary in the northern hemisphere, extending from Canada to Japan.

This leads one directly to the question of the extent to which Europe can disarm if it hopes to achieve a normal situation in its own house after nearly half a century of dual-bloc, armed-to-the-teeth rigidity. A further question is what this normal situation actually means, and how long it might take to restore it.

We have almost forgotten at this point that the disarmament negotiations on European intermediate-range missiles in 1987 resulted in the conclusion of the first agreement that will reduce the nuclear potential by four percent. The elimination of this potential is now approaching the 50-percent limit, meaning that more than half of the intermediate-range weapons still exist. But we have already crossed them off the list.

This is merely meant to clarify the amount of time that should be projected for disarmament processes, since after all they are linked to extremely complicated, reciprocal control mechanisms—to say nothing of the time needed for the physical destruction process—for which at least a decade must be allowed.

Nevertheless, the Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles meant a decrease in the threat from this specific nuclear potential, even if part of the potential is still there. Those who bear responsibility for security policy should, for caution's sake, observe the principle that as long as weapons exist, there will always be someone willing to use them.

This will also be true of all other weapon systems that are candidates for elimination within the framework of a future agreement, be it strategic nuclear systems, about a third of which are under discussion as the next step, tactical nuclear systems, which are being negotiated in Geneva, or conventional weapons, which involve tens of thousands of tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft, etc.

Regardless of how great the pressure is on the negotiations in Vienna, especially with regard to the (at this point upcoming) summit between Bush and Gorbachev, there are still a number of difficult questions to be resolved, about which it has not yet been possible to achieve consensus.

If we first look at the conventional potential in concrete terms, it is these weapons that are of the greatest interest to us.

Conventional Forces in Europe, "Atlantic to Urals" Mandate Area

	Battle Tanks (active units and depots)	
	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Acc. to NATO	22,224	51,500
Acc. to Warsaw Pact	30,690	59,470
NATO proposal	20,000	
Warsaw Pact proposal		20,000
	N + N*: 3,600; Austria: 170	

Conventional Forces in Europe, "Atlantic to Urals" Mandate Area (Continued)

	Artillery (active units and depots; number of guns)	
	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Acc. to NATO	17,328	43,400
Acc. to Warsaw Pact	57,060	71,560
NATO proposal (March 1989)	16,500	
Warsaw Pact proposal (May 1989)		24,000
	N + N: 8,000; Austria: 260	
	Combat Aircraft	
	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Acc. to NATO	3,977	8,250
Acc. to Warsaw Pact	7,130	7,876
U.S. proposal	5,700	
	N + N: 500; Austria: 31	

*Neutral and Non-Aligned

The greatest current obstacle to progress in the disarmament negotiations is the exclusion of naval forces, because the growing role of extra-European conflicts is critical to them due to their adaptability to preserving superpower interests throughout the world. This is also significant to the potential balance of power in Europe, because in the event of a conflict in Europe these forces can be safely and rapidly brought back to Europe.

An equally difficult problem is that of the air forces, whereby the East would like to have air defense aircraft (meaning interceptor aircraft) excluded from the equation in exchange for NATO's European armed trainers, stationed in the United States.

Other obstacles to a mutual balance of combat aircraft are expected in connection with the naval combat forces in the sense that the East wants to include the more than 1,000 American carrier-based aircraft. This seems logical at first glance, but it is not, because the United States, as already noted, regards its naval combat forces as a worldwide instrument for its security interests and sees the aircraft carrier together with the aircraft stationed on it as a unit. As a countermove, the USSR does not want to involve its land-based naval aircraft in the negotiations.

Also unclarified is the inclusion of the significant number of French and British combat aircraft. The only agreement that has been reached in the area of aircraft has been on attack helicopters.

In the meantime, voices are already being heard predicting difficult times ahead for the negotiations in Vienna, since the pending reunification issues of the German states and the increasingly clear declarations by Hungary of its desire to leave the Warsaw Pact could result in uncertainty about who is in fact negotiating with whom about what.

It will also take some time before these roadblocks have been cleared and the "superfluous" weapons have disappeared from the arsenals.

That is the real assessment by a military official, but it does not correspond to the majority public opinion in our country. Four decades of oppressive fear of a catastrophe that could be triggered by one of the two disproportionately armed alliances have apparently had a collective psychological effect which is now being expressed in an attitude of exaggerated expectations and which simplistically anticipates future results. We are dealing with a young generation no longer willing to accept what the European-American leadership stratum has offered them thus far, namely, the prospect of overkill and furthermore the reality of an environment threatened by toxic pollution.

It will take much effort and time to give them back the certainty of a hopeful future and confidence in a new European order. But this new order must first be created.

In Austria, the younger generation—following foreign mood patterns—is projecting its displeasure rather thoughtlessly on the Bundesheer [Federal Army].

For the time being, there are events occurring at extremely short intervals whose effects on the future situation in Europe cannot be assessed until a new European order has been found that can be accorded at least a certain degree of stability. The only thing that we know for sure right now is that the acute threat posed by the removal of armies trained to attack is fading close to our borders.

Once Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the front-line states of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Austrian army will have one less major worry. It will then be able to count on a (hopefully) adequate warning time and will no longer have to carry the continual concern that the political decision for mobilization will be made too late and that the army call-up could end in chaos. Mobilization costs money, and that is why we military people have always feared that it could be ordered too late.

It is necessary at this point to note one characteristic of our defense system that not all Austrians are aware of: The Bundesheer that fills our barracks during peacetime is in training and is only a fraction of the Bundesheer available for deployment.

The Bundesheer available for deployment is called in by company or unit for short training exercises in a two-year cycle, and in this way is kept at a feasible training level, so that it can be called in at relatively short notice if needed.

Thus, it is the typical defensive army known throughout the world. Only a small standby troop of 15,000 men and

an airborne troop of 5,000 men are ready for smaller tasks.

Let us examine troop strengths in Europe more closely:

Troop Comparison in Central Europe; CSCE Negotiating Framework Until End of 1991*

Peacetime Forces		
Warsaw Pact		
Army	Current number	Target
National People's Army [GDR]	168,000	60,000
Czecho-Slovak Army	199,700	179,700
Polish Army	327,000	287,000
Hungarian Army	102,000	75,000
Western Group of Forces [USSR]	398,300	
Northern Group of Forces [USSR]	56,800	195,000
Central Group of Forces [USSR]	79,000	0
Southern Group of Forces [USSR]	72,000	0
Total	1,402,000	796,700
NATO		
Stationed in the FRG		
	Current number	Target
U.S.	254,000	190,000
UK	67,000	67,000
Belgium	25,000	25,000
Netherlands	8,000	8,000
FRG Bundeswehr	450,000	450,000
France	55,000	55,000
Total	859,000	795,000
Other U.S. troops in Belgium, Netherlands, UK, Turkey under negotiation		35,000
Mobilization forces approx. twice the peacetime strength		
*including voluntary troop reductions		

Troop Comparison in Europe; "Atlantic to Urals" Mandate Area

	Personnel		
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	N + N*
Peacetime strength	3,450,000	3,800,000	350,000
Wartime strength	8,750,000	10,200,000	4,100,000

Announced voluntary troop reductions by Warsaw Pact, NATO, N + N: approx. 1,000,000 men

*Neutral and Non-Aligned

At the conference on military doctrines last January and February, our military defense system was described as the best defensive system in general. To move too hastily now in instituting cutbacks or even abolishing it would mean giving in to a fantastic enticement that could prove to be a catastrophic mistake.

Our political world is governed by electoral considerations, and these are by nature short-term and media-oriented. The elementary notion of patriotism comes under fire during partisan fighting and is often sacrificed to short-term effects. We should have learned better from history.

At present, there appear to be many Austrians who no longer believe in a threat. However, the military planner, especially one responsible for security policy, should never be swayed by speculative conduct, often characterized only by wishful thinking. What we should think of first and foremost right now is our state and our survival amidst real surroundings.

It is true that at present these surroundings do not present any acute threat. Thus, at present we cannot and should not develop models and concepts, even in scenarios—for right now, they could be formulated only as conjecture anyway—but rather should limit ourselves to focusing on the existing potential and on observing the events around us with care. Anything else would involve the risk of misjudgment.

At the same time, however, this should lead, for example, to an intensification of our intelligence services, and not to a reduction or even the elimination of them.

Until we are clear about the Europe of the future and our own position in this Europe of the future, we can clearly only hold on to what we have and then try to apply it as best we can. In so doing, we cannot help but do our part, even in an utterly peaceful intra-European situation, to ensure European security, which will in turn have to focus on the overall world picture.

Hopes for security-policy parasitism are in keeping neither with morality nor with the real assessment, so that demands for the abolition or immediate reduction of the national army are for the time being inappropriate. After all, our defense spending is still far below that of all comparable states in Europe, including (and especially) the neutral states.

As far as the period of military service and demands that it be shortened are concerned, a look at our neighbors' armies should be enough to make the situation obvious. Here I would like to limit myself to the short observation that you cannot create a soldier able to function within his unit in four months. The 60 days of weapon training (six days every two years) are necessary in order to make up somewhat for what has been forgotten. The weapon

training exercises do not provide an increase in the training level. Compare in this regard the periods of service of our neighbors:

Periods of Military Service		
FRG	15 months	
CSFR	18 months, 12 months	
Hungary	18 months (12 months as of 1991)	
Yugoslavia	12 months	
Italy	12 months	
Switzerland	364 days/-	118 days recruit training
	(350?)	160 days repetition course
		40 days supplemental course
		13 days Home Militia course
		11 days equipment inspection
		22 days firing practice

How can one expect a commander to deploy soldiers with an even greater training deficit against a significantly superior attacking force? The essence of any military action is joint action, working together in the unit. The individual soldier is only one of the preconditions for this. Thus, those who are calling for four months of basic military service in reality want to disband the army.

This basic fact also remains unaltered by efforts to appropriate more funding to the army in the area of catastrophic aid, UN deployment, or environmental protection, under the slogan of "a shift in weight." The ideal with the blue, white, and green helmets may clearly be politically attractive, but an army that is up to defending against an attack from the outside can easily take care of all these duties as subsidiary tasks. However, if these subsidiary tasks are made the primary responsibility, then a work-duty service is in any event the more inexpensive solution.

After an image-making and reflection phase, the coalition parties can now be expected to get started on objective reforms, whereby that which can happen quickly is smoothly taken care of and that for which more time is needed can be formulated peacefully and on solid foundations.

Our ultimate consideration should be that the status of each state continues to be measured according to its military power, in addition to its political, economic, social, and cultural strength: In short, it is measured according to what it has in its "talon," regardless of whether or not it is using it at the moment. It generates a higher assessment in the long run through its presence. We will not be able to change this structure alone, and if we try, we will sooner or later be isolated.

GERMANY

Reality, Potential of CSCE Role Examined

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ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Aug 90 p 8

[Analysis by Prof Ernst-Otto Czempiel, professor of international affairs, University of Frankfurt: "An Institution Which Reduces Uncertainty: What CSCE Can Do"]

[Text] CSCE is increasingly moving into the foreground of the debate regarding Europe's new political order. While NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the two alliances, are identified with the era of conflict which divided Europe, CSCE appears to become not only the symbol but also the instrument of European unity. Although it competes in the debate with other all-European organizations such as the ECE, the Economic Commission for Europe, which even remained intact during the Cold War or with the Council of Europe, it is CSCE which is expected to fulfill an organizing role for the whole of Europe. Can it live up to these expectations?

Depending on political preferences and geographical location, that question is being answered in different ways throughout the Western world. For the United States, CSCE still is a forum designed to transmit and help achieve the liberal concept of human rights and democracy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Washington views CSCE as the "conscience of the continent" and this is why the Americans considered it the right political product at the Copenhagen human rights conference which came to a close at the end of June. Even from the American point of view, to be sure, the work of CSCE has changed because the revolutions in East Europe and the GDR have resulted in the triumph of democracy and political civil and human rights. But a lot remains to be done to bring about their total realization, particularly in the Soviet Union the fate of whose reform programs is uncertain at best. As before, the nations of Eastern Europe need CSCE as a way of defining their political position within Europe and of unlinking themselves from the leadership of the Soviet Union within the Warsaw Pact without giving too much offense to the Kremlin. Thirty-five nations, i.e. members of the two pact systems and a number of neutral and nonaligned states, are taking part in CSCE. Most of them are democracies in the Western sense of the word. As matters stand, CSCE is well suited to serve as the gateway to the West and as a virtually ideal amplifier and multiplier of freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, even though it is an all-European organization and the two major powers are full members. With the help of CSCE the East Europeans can develop their democratic systems and increasingly forge stronger links to Western Europe without having to make any changes in their formalized relations with the Soviet Union. The internal and external freedom of Eastern Europe benefit from CSCE.

The United States would like to strengthen this particular aspect of CSCE's role. It should not be turned into an international organization, into a new United Nations and least of all into a new UNESCO. Its character as a series of different conferences should be retained, even if perpetuated as against past practice. Washington has proposed that the foreign ministers of the 35 nations should meet once a year and their deputies once every six months and that the large followup conferences should take place every other year. To follow up on Washington's words with deeds, Secretary of State Baker has invited the foreign ministers of the CSCE member nations to a first round of talks to be held this fall in conjunction with the meeting of the UN General Assembly.

But Washington would like to continue entrusting European security, i.e., assign exclusive responsibility for it, to NATO. CSCE should not appear to compete with NATO under any circumstances—not even by implication. It can work on confidence-building measures between the former opponents as well as assume responsibility for some verification measures. The 1986 CSCE agreement arrived at in Stockholm after all represented a breakthrough in confidence building. Above and beyond this, NATO should be given a role in conflict resolution which is to be discussed at the Valetta conference next January. The United States would also like to see CSCE deal with economic cooperation and improved communications.

But as far as guaranteeing Western security is concerned, Washington is thinking exclusively in terms of NATO. The alliance should be maintained and continue to operate even if its counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, should disband. The alliance has proved a success both as a security policy instrument in Europe and as the (only) organization of the Atlantic community. Like a tower of strength NATO has withstood the 40 years of the Cold War and by its strength and perseverance has contributed to Gorbachev's ability of pursuing a reform policy in the Soviet Union. By now, given the dramatic events in the East, the alliance is in a position to revise its strategy as it just did in London. It can assume a political role but it must not neglect its responsibility for safeguarding Western security and coherence.

On this point all the NATO partners are in agreement with Washington. But then the differences start. If NATO is to retain its security functions for the time being, it could transfer at least some of them to CSCE. If security cannot be had on any other basis than "mutual," why can't such "mutual" security be organized via CSCE as well? Back in May of this year French President Mitterand broached the idea of a European confederation in which the joint European organizations headed by CSCE might play a leading role. Foreign Minister Genscher conceives of CSCE as the "foundation of a united and free Europe" or at least a "stabilization framework" encompassing all of Europe. As long ago as 1984, Switzerland submitted a plan for a convention calling for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Europe.

Lately, another idea has surfaced to which the United States has already agreed, i.e., to establish a crisis and early warning system within CSCE for the purpose of identifying and defusing incipient conflicts.

The arguments and proposals are clearly identifiable on a west-to-east basis. The closer those making them are to the European dividing line, the greater the number of expectations they pin on CSCE and the more numerous the roles they would like to see assigned to the conference. That is quite understandable. Such closeness makes it much easier to realize how unnatural the division of Europe was and how numerous the common bonds are which link the two parts of the continent together. In this light, CSCE must inevitably be viewed as the all-European organization which will eventually, if not immediately, replace the two alliances which divide Europe. The more democracy succeeds in the East and the more progress is made in conventional disarmament, the sooner can European security be entrusted to cooperation among the democracies. Viewed from this angle, CSCE does not compete with NATO but serves as a complement to it—where this relationship should be viewed as being dynamic. The further the possibility of military conflict recedes, the more CSCE will be able to assume responsibilities which could previously be discharged by the military alliances alone.

The question of what CSCE can do is almost of no consequence in the context of the intra-Western debate about what CSCE should do. There is a fairly clear idea about NATO can do. Both its potential and its limitations will hardly undergo any change in the years ahead. But only time will tell what a conference such as CSCE can do. As a series of conferences it is a relatively new instrument which can boast a remarkable record of success. But this historical record cannot serve as the basis for predicting the future in view of the fact that the context of CSCE changed in the fall of 1989. Ever since 1975, CSCE has worked for improvements in the "human dimension" (Basket 3 of the Final Act) but above all for improvements in human rights in the Warsaw Pact area (Basket 1). The great breakthrough was achieved in Copenhagen after the revolution in the countries of Eastern Europe had already accomplished it.

In dealing with its second task, i.e., reaching agreement on confidence-building measures between East and West, CSCE went through a different but similar experience. In this field it achieved its greatest success in Stockholm in 1986 where the participants agreed on far-reaching confidence-building measures between the military blocs. That was the achievement of CSCE. Conventional disarmament on which East and West agreed in 1989 was a matter to be resolved by the two military alliances themselves.

The very results achieved by CSCE demonstrate that it owed its existence to the East-West conflict. It organized the exchange of human rights for economic concessions and bridged confrontation by means of a draft for

confidence-building measures. Both of these tasks are in the process of being accomplished, if not actually superseded. That is not the only reason why the proposals being made in the context of the current debate appear nebulous. What can CSCE still achieve in a Europe in which the democratization of Eastern Europe (and perhaps the Soviet Union as well) has done away with the root cause of the East-West conflict and which has embarked on the road to disarmament in Vienna? As the front lines of the conflict recede, the functions of the institution which helped to break through and weaken these front lines diminish in their turn.

Those who would have CSCE secure the emerging political order in Europe wish thereby to cap the success of the past with new successes. It is to function as an international organization to safeguard "collective security." If the 35 nations stand together, aggression will no longer succeed. Unfortunately, the "collective security" concept sounds more convincing than it really is. As the fate of the League of Nations and the United Nations demonstrates, it has a fundamental weakness. It does not work. For, either there is agreement among the members of such a security system, in which case the concept is unnecessary. But if there is no agreement and an aggression is committed, the collectivity which was to produce security no longer exists. This argument leads to the conclusion that CSCE, too, cannot safeguard security. This can only be done by each nation or each community of nations individually. This is the real reason for maintaining NATO. Like every other military alliance, it guarantees security, albeit at high and dangerous expense.

Just the same, CSCE is indispensable. Even if it cannot provide a security guarantee, it can at least appreciably reduce the need for one. Wars do not only break out because one side dares to commit military aggression. Almost one-half of all modern wars broke out against the will of the nations which ultimately became involved in them. They were triggered by a factor recognizable only by its aftereffects, i.e., the uncertainty built into the structure of the international system regarding the intentions and the behavior of the other side. Since no central authority exists in an international system capable of pronouncing sanctions and since fundamental uncertainty exists regarding the desires and the potential of the other side, the goal of security is activated in each nation on that basis. By preparing to safeguard its own security under these conditions, the individual nation involuntarily confirms the fears of the other members of the system who then behave accordingly. As a consequence, defense against force frequently results in its topical use.

It is at this point that the concept of international organization takes over. It cannot create security but it can reduce uncertainty. This idea which first came up in the 18th century has frequently been misinterpreted in the sense of the above-mentioned "collective security" concept. Nevertheless, the idea was both simple and correct. If the nations belonging to an international system continually cooperate in an organized manner

and maintain constant contact with one another, this cooperation provides for information and certainty and uncertainty is reduced. This does not eliminate all causes leading to the use of force in the international system. But one of the causes, perhaps the most significant cause of all, would be reduced, i.e., uncertainty.

CSCE could take over this job in the Europe to come. Whatever the European order will look like, it will have to organize the communal lives of 600 million people perhaps no longer living together in 35 different nations but still in several states or associations of states. The new Europe will not become a unified state anytime soon or even a federation of states but a regional system composed of several states and federations. In other words, it will be an open system marked by uncertainties which can emerge independent of the good intentions of the system's members. The principal prerequisite for the creation and operation of a peaceful European order will be to do away with this uncertainty. CSCE, to be sure, is not an international organization. Its Final Act is not an internationally binding document but only a loose agreement. It is alive only in the sense of the continuity of followup and specialized conferences. In modern political science terms it is a "regime," an ensemble of implicit and explicit principles, standards, behavioral norms and rules of decisionmaking with which the participants comply. Expected behavior thus is reciprocally stabilized. Continuing practice assumes a life of its own and ultimately becomes an institution, a rather informal but durable cooperative arrangement based on a set of rules (or too many rules).

An institution is no less effective than an international organization but it is a great deal more flexible. This has always been described as the special value of CSCE. Of course such an institution is much more fragile than an international organization. It can cease to exist because of inactivity. In order to provide CSCE with a legal basis, it should be turned into an international organization even if its flexibility were to suffer as a consequence. It could be given a general secretary and a secretariat and would then become a regional organization, as provided for under Article 52 of the UN Charter. There also is a third, less taxing solution, i.e., a middle course between institutionalization based on practice and formalization based on organization. It might consist in making CSCE practices legally binding and in transforming the Helsinki Final Act into a binding agreement under international law. As obsolete as the wide-ranging document already is in some respects, it would have to be trimmed down and concentrate on the rules governing cooperation spelled out in the politically important first part of the Final Act. This part of the document is devoted to the "principles which guide relations between the member states." The passages devoted to conflict resolution would have to be expanded and the creation of a conflict resolution center be added. It will be unavoidable to set up a rudimentary organization and a small secretariat for this purpose.

CSCE can assume additional responsibilities above and beyond this central one, e.g., hold conferences on the ecology, transportation and tourism. The broader the areas of cooperation are, the greater will its impact be on the reduction of uncertainty. Thus, CSCE could also take up some aspects of the future Germany agreement, e.g., the termination of four-power responsibilities or specific arms limitations. There are other all-European interests for which CSCE could assume responsibility, e.g., in the area of arms control and confidence-building measures as it has in the past. The interdependence between East and West is extensive enough to warrant the existence of an institution devoted to joint consideration of common interests.

Only the central agreement to resolve conflicts without resorting to force and to collaborate on a continuing basis toward this end should be made legally binding. Conferences on this subject should be held once a year or when required—not only on the governmental but also on the parliamentary level. Cooperation among the popular representatives is of particular importance in reducing uncertainty. That is the crux of the matter. Everything CSCE has already achieved and what it might achieve in the future could conceivably be assigned to other institutions and organizations. But only an institution like CSCE can remove or at least lessen uncertainty, which is one of the most dangerous causes of violence.

FRG Chief Delegate Views Vienna CFE Talks

AU0110094690 Vienna *DIE PRESSE* in German
29-30 Sep 90 p 4

[Interview with Ruediger Hartmann, chief delegate of the united Germany to the Vienna CFE talks, by Burkhard Bischof in Vienna; date not given: "A New Disarmament Chapter Will Be Opened in Helsinki"]

[Text] [Bischof] At the foreign ministers' meeting of the superpowers in Moscow several weeks ago, the U.S. side suggested that agreement could possibly be reached on conventional forces in Europe; such agreement would not include fighter aircraft. However, your Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said during his recent appearance here in Vienna that a CFE treaty that does not include an effective limitation of aircraft is "patchwork." What is the current state of affairs? Will aircraft be included in the first CFE treaty or not?

[Hartmann] There is full agreement in the West that aircraft will be included in the first agreement on conventional forces in Europe. That is also suggested because the existing Soviet superiority in aircraft over NATO must be abolished. Now there is the additional pressure of the summit, and there is parity between the alliances. I do not see why it should not be easier to solve the aircraft issue in future negotiations.

The most important unresolved point in this respect is the way the land-based aircraft of the navies should be dealt with. Agreed upper ceilings for aircraft would be

useless if there was still a possibility to avoid them by classing them with the naval forces which are not a subject of the negotiations. Following the talks that Federal Foreign Minister Genscher held with his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze in New York earlier this week, a solution is taking shape on this issue, too.

[Bischof] People say that the superpowers' troops deployed in Europe, which the USSR and the United States early this year agreed to reduce to 195,000 and 225,000 men, respectively, would not have to be considered. In fact, political developments have made these figures obsolete. Do the superpowers' troops that are deployed in Europe have to be at all considered in the treaty?

[Hartmann] There is already a basic consensus to discuss the limitation of military personnel in follow-up negotiations which will be held immediately following the CFE-I talks. Such consensus was created on the basis of the statement that Foreign Minister Genscher made in Vienna late in August. In this statement, he said firmly that united Germany would reduce its forces to 370,000 men, with no more than 345,000 men forming part of the Army and Air Force. Therefore, the agreement reached by all 23 negotiating partners in the spring on limiting the superpowers' troops that are deployed in Europe, has become obsolete.

[Bischof] The Vienna negotiations have recently been additionally complicated by the Soviet demand to retain 40 percent of all the weapons that are stockpiled in Europe after the reductions agreed upon in the CFE treaty. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact states think that this percentage is too high. What lies behind this Soviet demand?

[Hartmann] This Soviet demand has so far been the last major obstacle to a negotiation result. It means that the Soviet Union has claimed for itself about 40 percent of all the arms stocks of all participants that are covered by the treaty. No other negotiating partner could accept this claim, especially not the other East European countries that would be particularly affected.

In the talks between Foreign Minister Genscher, Secretary of State Baker, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New York in recent days, a compromise has been reached. According to this compromise, no country may retain more than one third of the materiel of all participants covered by the agreement.

[Bischof] Has the issue of regional ceilings on which Bulgaria and Turkey differed meanwhile been resolved?

[Hartmann] The issue of individual regional interim ceilings has not been resolved. A solution to this problem depends in particular on whether the East European countries will be able to agree on their future national stocks of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery.

[Bischof] How far have the negotiations proceeded on the issue of destroying or converting the arms potential that is to be reduced?

[Hartmann] The negotiating partners are in agreement that in principle, the weapons systems that have to be reduced must be destroyed. However, they also agree that as an exception, a quantitatively limited number of weapons may be converted for peaceful purposes. We thereby meet a Soviet wish. The Western side is not particularly interested in the conversion of weapons for peaceful purposes because it doubts whether this is profitable.

[Bischof] Verification will be a comprehensive chapter of the treaty. How far has work proceeded in this respect?

[Hartmann] Verification is the most complex issue that has yet to be resolved. Good progress has been made in recent months. However, much has yet to be done. Above all, we must solve the politically important problem of inspection quotas for the individual countries. Nonetheless, I am optimistic that we will reach a timely result.

[Bischof] How much of the planned treaty has been firmly agreed upon?

[Hartmann] In view of the large number of complex issues in connection with the treaty, it is difficult to give an assessment. With due caution, I would assume that provisional agreement has been reached on about half the texts. What is more important, however, is the fact that the number of controversial issues has been considerably reduced, and following recent developments in New York, I do not see any problem that could not be resolved by compromise.

[Bischof] Nonetheless, is there the danger that the Paris CSCE summit scheduled to begin on 19 November could be postponed because the disarmament negotiations in Vienna cannot be concluded in time?

[Hartmann] Following the recent developments in New York, I do not see such a danger.

[Bischof] Are there any concepts or plans to continue the conventional disarmament negotiations in Vienna after the first agreement has been signed?

[Hartmann] There is basic consensus that following the Paris summit, the CFE talks will be continued with the same participants to conclude the process that was begun in March 1989. In the second phase, which we call CFE-Ia, we will essentially discuss supplementary aspects and possibly certain amendments that may be required by political developments in Europe. A very important task is the limitation of the military personnel of all participants.

I assume that following the CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki, that is, late in 1992 or early in 1993, a new

chapter of conventional arms control will be opened on the basis of a new mandate, and then all CSCE states will take part.

Lafontaine Calls for Nuclear-Arms-Free Germany

LD2609123490 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1101 GMT 26 Sep 90

[Excerpts] Berlin (ADN)—Candidate for chancellor Oskar Lafontaine, speaking today at the congress of the GDR SPD [Social Democratic Party], called for a nuclear-weapons-free Germany. In his electoral speech, in which he concentrated mainly on concepts for achieving the social union of Germany, he pointed out that the results reached by Kohl and Gorbachev in the Caucasus are putting into practice long-standing concepts of the Social Democrats. The recognition of the Polish western border, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, the practical reduction of the armed forces by half, Germany's renunciation of ABC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] weapons, and changes to the NATO strategy had been demands of the SPD, summed up in the term "security partnership." If it had been possible in the Caucasus to declare the GDR a nuclear-free zone, it would be "consistent" to withdraw all nuclear weapons from Germany.

The predictable high cost of unification, including the billions [monetary unit not specified] for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, requires cuts in the defense budget. Above all, the Jaeger-90 project should be abandoned, Lafontaine said and added that the changes in Eastern Europe demand the discontinuation of all large maneuvers, as well as military low-flying. [passage omitted]

"You are looking at a person who is tried and tested in winning elections." With this confident final sentence, Oskar Lafontaine the Saarland minister-president and SPD candidate for chancellor, encouraged his comrades from the East to step up the election campaign. [passage omitted]

Weekly Notes Chemical Shipment Destined for Iraq

LD2909075790 Hamburg DPA in German 0024 GMT 29 Sep 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—According to a report in next Monday's edition of DER SPIEGEL, very highly placed German Government authorities are trying to prevent the onward journey of a German freighter, which is docked off Turkey with around 90 tonnes of sodium cyanide on board. The chemical is used in the production of the agents prussic acid and tabun and was officially to be handed over to the Iranian mining industry. DER SPIEGEL does not give the name of the ship in the prereleased report.

The goods had been sold by the Hamburg firm Rotex-chemie International Handels-GmbH & Company to a Belgian firm. DER SPIEGEL states that Ankara learned

the freight was destined for Iraq. The authorities immediately informed the German Embassy, which in turn alerted the foreign Ministry. The Hamburg State Prosecutor's Office had been called in on the case at the end of last week, DER SPIEGEL says.

Pershing-1A Missiles Decommissioned

LD0410103790 Berlin ADN International Service in German 1009 GMT 4 Oct 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (ADN)—The Federal Army's Pershing-1A missiles in Landsberg were decommissioned today, one day after the unification of Germany, by Holger Pfahls, state secretary in the Federal Defense Ministry. At the same time, the missile squadrons of the Air Force in Landsberg and in Geilenkirchen were taken out of the NATO command, the Federal Defense Ministry in Bonn said. In the two squadrons, the Federal Army has at its disposal a total of 72 Pershing-1A tactical missile systems. [passage omitted]

SWEDEN

Soviets Seek Higher Share Under CSCE Ceilings

PM2709141390 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Sep 90 p 10

[Report by Bjarne Stenquist: "Soviet Demands Upset Talks"]

[Text] Vienna—The Soviet Union is demanding that it be allowed to have 80 percent of the most important weapons within the Warsaw Pact. The demand is slowing down agreement on a European disarmament treaty. Now the smaller countries within the collapsing defense alliance are protesting at the Soviet Union's behavior.

As far as tanks are concerned the Soviet demands mean in principle that the country would have 16,000 of the total of 20,000 tanks which NATO and the Warsaw Pact would each have under the terms of a disarmament treaty. The other five members of the Warsaw Pact would have to share the remaining 4,000. The Soviet Union is demanding a similar share of troop transporters, artillery pieces, aircraft, and helicopters.

The distribution among the Warsaw Pact was discussed at a meeting in Bratislava last weekend but without any solution to the problem being found. A new attempt will be made in Prague 22-23 September.

"This shows that the Soviet Union has still not made up its mind about whether it should follow a new line of cooperation in Europe or the old one of military dominance," said Istvan Gyarmati, Hungary's unprecedentedly young new ambassador to the negotiations.

"For us it also proves that the Warsaw Pact is completely unusable for political cooperation and the coordination

of disarmament negotiations. The pact is under a death sentence, and we will not remain members for much longer," Gyarmati stressed.

The disarmament negotiations in Vienna are now under pressure to reach a conclusion before the CSCE summit in Paris 19 November.

The disagreements among the former Warsaw Pact allies are a result of the fact that the revolutions in Eastern Europe have rapidly overtaken the negotiators in Vienna. When they began their work in the spring of 1989 Europe was still divided into two blocs.

The negotiations are built on the notion that the two blocs will be allowed to retain similar quantities of the most important categories of arms: 20,000 tanks, 30,000 troop transporters, 18,000 artillery pieces (NATO's proposal), 1,900 helicopters, and approximately 7,000 combat aircraft. Everything over these levels will be scrapped.

Then it is up to each alliance to distribute this materiel between its various member nations. However, to prevent the Soviet Union from becoming too powerful no single country may take more than 60 percent of an alliance's quota. Previously the Soviet Union agreed to this in principle.

"The situation has now changed. Our former allies have called for an end to the military cooperation in the Warsaw Pact while NATO remains the same in all essentials. The Soviet Union must now see to its security interests alone," a Soviet diplomat told DAGENS NYHETER.

"Those who think that 80 percent is too much forget that the Soviet Union is a big country. We have a surface area to defend that is twice as big as all the other countries involved in the negotiations put together," he added.

But the situation is not completely deadlocked. The Soviet approach also contains a political demarche that the Soviet Union wants greater concrete changes in NATO.

"The London declaration from NATO on cooperation with the Soviet Union and on studies for a new military doctrine is very important, but we would like to see more concrete decisions, for example on short-range nuclear arms. We hope they understand our message," DAGENS NYHETER's Soviet source said.

Privately the Soviet Union has declared that it could be content with 14,000 tanks (70 percent) if it is allowed instead to have a higher proportion of artillery pieces and aircraft. Hungary has proposed that the Soviet Union should have an average allocation of 66 percent.

The Soviet stance here is also influenced by the fact that the whole situation in central Europe has changed since the negotiations began.

The two sides have long been agreed that in the central disarmament region (Benelux, West and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) each alliance should have 8,000 tanks.

But with East Germany's unification with West Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the rest of Eastern Europe, there will be no Soviet tanks stationed in the area in a few years' time. Fewer than 4,000 tanks belonging to Poland and Czechoslovakia will remain, against the West's 8,000.

"The negotiating mandate speaks of far-reaching reductions to equal levels. This is something different," a Soviet diplomat said.

NATO's response is that it is not NATO's fault if no country wants to have Soviet troops on its territory any longer.

TURKEY

Shipment of Lethal Chemicals for Iran Seized

TA2709165990 Ankara ANATOLIA in English
1633 GMT 27 Sep 90

[Text] Mersin (A.A)—A ship with a cargo of chemicals which can be used in the manufacture of deadly mustard gas was impounded by customs officials in this Mediterranean port on Thursday.

The chemicals were destined to be sent overland to Iran.

The Polish-flagged Wloclawek was loaded at the Belgian port of Antwerp with 180 tonnes of neophrene and sodium cyanide.

Both chemicals are used in the manufacture of deadly mustard, internationally banned as a weapon after World War I.

A report in HURRIYET newspaper said the U.S. Treasury Department had warned Turkish officials about the potentially lethal cargo, which the newspaper alleged was ultimately destined for Iraq.

The landing documents, however, showed the recipient of the chemicals to be a Tehran-based company, Sherkate Saderati va Tejareti Melli.

It is unlikely that Iran, which suffered heavily under Iraq's chemical attacks in the eight-year Gulf war, would permit the cargo to go to Iraq.

Iran is known to be pursuing technology for the manufacture of its own chemical weapons.

HURRIYET mentioned Canadian and Swiss firms as the suppliers of the chemicals, but another source suggested that West German firms were involved and that the chemicals were initially shipped from West Germany to Antwerp.

Lethal Chemicals Shipment Returned to Belgium

*TA2809171590 Ankara ANATOLIA in English
1637 GMT 28 Sep 90*

[Text] Ankara (A.A)—A cargo of chemicals used in the manufacture of deadly mustard gas which was impounded by customs officials aboard a ship in the Mediterranean port of Mersin on Thursday will be sent back on the same ship to the Belgian port of Antwerp where the cargo was first loaded, officials said on Friday.

The cargo of 102 tonnes of sodium cyanide and 31 tonnes of neoprene brought to Mersin by the Polish-flagged Wloclawek were reportedly destined to be sent overland to Iran.

Both chemicals are used in the manufacture of deadly mustard gas internationally banned as a weapon since World War I.

A report in the Istanbul-based HURRIYET newspaper said on Thursday that the U.S. Treasury Department had warned Turkish officials about the potentially lethal cargo, which the newspaper alleged was ultimately destined for Iraq.

Customs authorities on Friday did not permit the chemicals to be unloaded from the Wloclawek at the port and the ship will sail from Mersin in the evening, the officials told A.A.

The officials also said the chemicals were produced in West Germany and that they were sent from there to Antwerp.

One official told ANATOLIA that the incident shows foreign customs offices are careless about loading delicate materials. "It is interesting to see that the chemicals were produced in West Germany, shipped from there to Belgium, marketed by a Belgian company and sent by a Polish ship to Turkey and it is only here that we could discover the incident," he said.

Iran is known to be pursuing technology for the manufacture of its own chemical weapons.

Officials Explain Decision on Chemical Shipment

*NC0210175990 Paris AFP in English
1712 GMT 2 Oct 90*

[Text] Ankara, October 2 (AFP)—Turkish officials on Tuesday denied that they stopped a Polish ship from unloading a cargo of Iran-bound chemicals, including sodium cyanide, last week because it was feared the cargo was really for Iraq.

Turkish officials said the unloading was forbidden simply because the ship's papers were incomplete.

The cargo, which included 100 metric tons of sodium cyanide made in West Germany, was loaded aboard the Wloclawek in Antwerp, Belgium.

The Belgian company involved in the shipping, Eiffe, said earlier that the order banning the unloading of the cargo was motivated by Turkish suspicions that the cargo was illegally destined for Iraq.

The cargo left the port of Mersin, Turkey, on Saturday.

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